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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH ANN BARSON, a minor
by and through her guardians

ad litem, Dennie J. Barson
and Kathleen W. Barson,
Case No. 18254

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

-----------------------------------------
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NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of a products liability action brought
by the parents as guardians ad litem on behalf of Elizabeth Ann
Barson, a minor, to recover damages for birth defects, principally
the absence of both arms,

allegedly caused by the pre-natal

administration to the plaintiff's mother of the drug Delalutin,
manufactured by the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. ("Squibb"). 1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW

The case was tried to a jury which rendered a verdict against
Squibb for $1.5 million, upon which judgment was entered.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Squibb seeks a new trial based on the erroneous and prejudicial
admission of certain evidence at the trial, the erroneous legal
instructions given to the jury by the trial court over the objection
of Squibb, and the trial court's failure to grant Squibb's motions
to dismiss and for a new trial.
1

The amended complaint in this case charged E. R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., the operating company, and Squibb Corporation, its
parent, as defendants. Squibb Corporation obtained a directed
verdict during the course of the trial and, hence, is not involved
in the appeal (Tr.1497). The amended complaint also named Dr.
Parkinson, the treating physician, as a defendant. Dr. Parkinson
obtained summary judgment prior to the commencement of trial
(PR.113-117).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

The Drug Delalutin and Its Regulatory History Through
the Time of Use By Plaintiff's Mother.

Delalutin, whose chemical name is 17-alpha-hydroxyprogesterone
caproate, is an injectable drug product developed prior to 1955
by Schering A.G., an international pharmaceutical company located
in Berlin,

Germany (Tr.1902,

2178). 2

Delalutin is chemically

identical to progestational hormones naturally present in the
female with the exception that a caproate ester is added to
hydroxyprogesterone

to make

it biologically more active and

longer-lasting (Tr.1800; P.Ex.lO(a)).
Progestational agents,
progesterone,

including progesterone and hydroxy-

are essential in the maintenance of a pregnancy

(Tr.390, 832, 1517-18, 1519-1520, 1555, 1913; D.Ex.820).

One of

their main effects is to insure relaxation of the uterus during
pregnancy (Tr.1520; 1817-1819; 1913).

The uterus, which in its

2

References to the record in this case will be made in the
following manner.
(1) One volume of separately numbered papers and pleadings
filed in the trial court and designated for inclusion in the
record on appeal will be prefaced by the letter "R."
(2) A separate one-volume transcript of the proceedings at
pretrial will be prefaced by the letters "PR.tr
(3) Sixteen volumes of transcript of trial and post-trial
proceedings, will be referred to by the abbreviation "Tr. 11 •
(4) All exhibits received at trial will be referred to by
the Letters "P. Ex." for plaintiff's Exhibits and "D. Ex." for
Squibb's Exhibits.
-2-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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normal non-pregnant condition is a firm muscular organ

~out

the

size of a pear, must expand significantly by the end of gestation
to accommodate a full-term baby (Tr.1520).

Uterine contractions

during early pregnancy due to a deficiency of hydroxyprogesterone
may tear the placenta from the uterine wall causing bleeding or
spotting (vaginal bleeding) ;

if sufficient tearing occurs a

miscarriage or spontaneous an abortion may follow (Tr.1823).

If

the condition is treated promptly and the uterus relaxed the
child might be saved (Tr.1824).

It is recognized, however, that

in many instances of threatened abortion the fetus is genetically
abnormal and an abortion occurs in any event (Tr .1824; 1885).
In January 1956 Squibb filed a New Drug Application ("NDA")
with the United States Food and Drug Administration ( 11 FDA"),
providing information establishing the safety of Delalutin. 3 The
package inserts submitted in connection with the NDA noted that
the drug was safe for a variety of medical indications, 4 including
the management of amenorrhea, the prevention of habitual and
3

In 1955, Schering licensed Squibb to market this drug in the
United States (Tr.527-528; P.Ex.231). In connection with this
licensing Schering made its extensive animal test data regarding
Delalutin available to Squibb (Tr.1692). Squibb also performed
various animal tests on the drug in order to develop safety data
for submission to Federal regulatory authorities (Tr.1236-1237,
1683, 1691, 1713, 2001-2002). All applicable tests required by
the FDA were performed and these tests revealed no toxicity in
animals (Tr.1238-1239, 1671-1674, 1691, 1713-1715).
4

The physician package insert is a compilation of information
relating to the use of a prescription drug directed to the physician
(Cont'd)
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threatened abortion,

and other uses (P.Ex.lO(a)}.

Squibb's NDA

for Delalutin was approved March 13, 1956, and the company began
marketing the drug product (Tr.1502; D.Ex.803).
The physician package insert was changed from time to time
over the next 15 years.

As with the original insert, all changes

to it were subject to FDA direction and control (Tr.411, 1630,
2037, 2048, 2075).
During this period, a number of other synthetic progestational
agents were marketed by various pharmaceutical houses both in the
United States and elsewhere.

Although similar in some regards,

these compounds also had marked differences from both naturally
formed progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone (Delalutin), as well
as from one another (Tr.1061, 1555, 1694-1695, 1768, 1917-1931).
For example, many of them were combined with estrogen for use as
birth control pills and pregnancy tests; Delalutin was not used
for either purpose (P.Ex. 10(0); D.Ex.819, 821; Tr.718, 721, 823,
869, 875, 890, 892, 1863, 1929-1930, 2010, 2038).
The knowledge that drugs could cross the placenta and adversely
affect a developing fetus was first gained as a result of the

4 (Cont'd)
and other health care providers, and is included with the drug
packaging.
The insert includes information relative to chemical
composition, indications for use, adverse reactions and routes of
administration.
While the FDA seeks, receives and analyzes
information from the pharmaceutical company and physicians as to
their experiences with a drug, the agency retains final approval
over the entire content of the insert.
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experience in the early 1960's with Thalidomide (Tr.740-741), a
tranquilizer manufactured and marketed throughout much of Europe,
South America, Australia, Japan and Canada (Tr.990), though never
approved for marketing in the United States (Tr.990).

The drug

caused severe malformations in a large number of offspring of
mothers who took it during pregnancy.

Conceptually, this experience

represented a watershed in medical/scientific thinking (Tr.739-741).
Prior to the mid-1960's, formal teratological studies were
not done by pharmaceutical companies anywhere in the world. 5
These tests were not part of the "state of the art" (Tr .1233).
In light of the Thalidomide experience, the FDA, in cooperation
with Squibb and several other pharmaceutical companies, developed
guidelines for teratology tests on animals (Tr.559, 2015; P.Ex 62).
Beginning in 1966, such testing was required on all drugs then in
the process of development.

These tests, however, were not

required for drugs already on the market, such as Del al utin
(P.Ex.62; Tr.581, 1227-28, 1953).
Squibb representatives met with the FDA shortly after publication of the guidelines to discuss whether teratological testing
nonetheless should be done on drugs already on the market (Tr.1677,
1695-1696).

It was jointly agreed that since Delalutin had then

been on the market for 10 years, and had been used extensively in
5

Teratology is the branch of science that deals with the
production, development, anatomy and classification of malformed
fetuses.
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hundreds of thousands of pregnant women without any reports of
teratological effects,

further animal testing under these new

guidelines was unnecessary {Tr.1677-1680, 1695-1696, 1714-1715,
1953, 2043-2044).
In 1962 Congress amended the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act and introduced an efficacy requirement for drugs (21 U.S.C.
§

321 (p) ( 1)).

Congress also determined that NDA' s, which had

been approved between 1938 and 1962 on the existing standard of
safety data alone, should be reviewed for the efficacy of each
medical use or indication set out in the previously approved
NDA's.

The

standard of proof for efficacy was

"substantial

evidence. 116

6

. "Substantial evidence" is a statutory term of art.
defined in 21 u.s.c. § 355(d) as:

It is

evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations ... on
the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
effect it purports or is represented to have ....
The failure to find "substantial evidence" does not mean that the
drug is not efficacious. Frequently such a finding means nothing
more than that no double-blind studies, thought by some to be
synonomous with "adequate and well-controlled investigations, 11
were performed.
A double-blind study describes a methodology
where neither the physician nor the patient knows whether they
are prescribing or receiving the active drug ingredient or a
placebo (non-active ingredient).
Giving some patients placebos and withholding a drug that is
believed useful raises certain ethical problems (Tr.822). Because
of these ethical problems, the Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs
(Cont'd)
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The FDA contracted with the National Academy of SciencesNational Research Council ( "NAS-NRC") to undertake this retrospective review. 7 The NAS-NRC review procedure itself was conducted by panels of physicians and other experts familiar with
particular categories or families of drugs. This review resulted
in advisory reports to the FDA. 8 That agency reviewed the reports
and published its findings as Drug Efficacy Study Implementation
(DESI) Notices in the Federal Register.

Note, "Drug Efficacy and

the 1962 Drug Amendments," 60 Geo. L.J. 185, 207-212 (1971).
The NAS-NRC established categories which served as a basis
for evaluating the effectiveness of each indication claimed for a
drug.

The more important categories were: (1) Effective; (2) Prob-

ably effective; (3) Possibly effective; and (4) Ineffec6 {Cont'd)
Advisory Committee to the FDA ("FDA Fertility Commi ttee 11 ) , in
making its recommendations as to the efficacy of Delalutin for
the treatment of habitual abortion, relied on studies that used
historical controls--the use by the clinical investigator of the
patient's own reproductive history as a measure of therapeutic
efficacy (R~; Tr.2610, 2625).
7

See National Academy of Sciences, "Drug Efficacy Study,
Final Report to the Conunissioner of Food & Drugs," Food~ Drug
Administration 1 (1969) ("Drug Efficacy Study").
8

Guidelines which were established by the NAS~NRc delineating
the functions of the expert panels suggested that drug evaluations
be based upon: 11 ( 1) factual information . . . freely available in
the scientific literature, (2) factual information ... available
from the FDA, from the manufacturer or other sources, or (3) ...
experience and informed judgment of the members of the panels."
Drug Efficacy Study, App. A., 3, at 43.
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tive. 9

In 1966, Squibb made an initial submission of information

to the NAS-NRC panel comprised of medical studies reporting the
efficacy of Delalutin for its clinical indications, references to
Delalutin in the world literature, and information from its NDA.
On September 9, 1971, the FDA reported its evaluation of the
recommendations received from the NAS-NRC as to Delalutin.
Fed. Reg. 18115 (September 9, 1971).

36

The FDA found Delalutin to

be "effective" for a variety of indications (P.Ex.lO(n); P.Ex.lO(o)).
Delalutin was found to be "probably effective" in preventing
habitual and threatened abortions.
1971);

P.Ex. lO(n);

P.Ex. lO(o).

10

36 Fed. Reg. 18115 (September 9,
The notice

specifically

authorized continued marketing of Delalutin for prevention of
habitual and threatened abortions.

Id. at 18115; 35 Fed. Reg.

11274 (July 14, 1970); P.Ex.lO(n); P.Ex.lO(o).

9

In evaluating these pre-1962 drugs, NAS-NRC panels often
found that the new statutory standard of "substantial evidence"
needed to support a finding of efficacy was exceedingly exacting.
The panels ' approach in the case of drugs recognized by the
consensus of physicians as effective, but for which supporting
data derived from statutorily adequate investigations was
lacking, was the liberal use of the designations "probably effective" and "possibly effective." Drug Efficacy Study at 9; Note,
11
Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments," 60 Geo. L.J. 185,
210 n. 156 (1971).
10
As related at Point IV A at 75 n. 51 of this Brief infra,
the issue which may be relevant under Restatement of Torts (2d),
§ 402A, Comment k, is not efficacy in fact but "apparent" efficacy.
Consequently, from a legal standpoint, only FDA declarations on
efficacy made at or about the date of use are relevant, assuming
that the statements are otherwise admissible.
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Squibb promptly amended its physician package insert to
comply with the FDA directive (P.Ex.lO(n)).

The November 1971

revision of the physician package insert was in effect at the
time Kathleen Barson received Delalutin (P.Ex.lO(o)).

Up to that

time there had been no reports in the medical literature associating limb reduction defects with progestational therapy in
general or Delalutin in particular (Tr.1062; P.Ex.762).

Further,

Delalutin had then been on the market for 16 years and had been
administered to hundreds of thousands of pregnant women without
reports of any such effects (Tr.2043-2044).
B.

The Injuries Precipitating This Law Suit.

Kathleen Barson, the mother of the plaintiff, first suspected
she was pregnant while on a camping trip in the beginning of
July, 1972 (Tr. 349).

Shortly after Mrs. Barson's return to Utah

on July 8 or 9, she contacted the office of Dr. L. Spencer Parkinson,
a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist in Logan and was given an
appointment for August 4 (Tr.350, 366, 370).
On July 25, 1972, Mrs. Barson experienced spotting (vaginal
bleeding) which was of sufficient concern that she contacted Dr.
Parkinson's office (Tr. 350); she had not experienced this in her
other pregnancies (Tr.350).

Dr. Parkinson's office made arrange-

ments for the doctor to see her on the next day (Tr. 338-351,
367).

Dr. Parkinson saw Kathleen Barson on July 26th and received

information from her with regard to the commencement of her last
menstural period (Tr. 378; D Ex. 804).

The doctor's records
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indicate that Mrs. Barson advised him that this period had commenced
on June 1 (Id.).
After determining that Mrs. Barson was pregnant and that she
was spotting and cramping, Dr. Parkinson diagnosed a threatened
abortion and administered
(Tr. 339, 367, 378-381).

250 mg. of Delalutin intramuscularly
This was appropriate obstetrical practice

in July 1972, and Mrs. Barson's spotting stopped (Tr.360, 381).
When Mrs. Barson returned on August 4, 1972 for her regular
appointment, Dr. Parkinson took a complete history and did an
examination (Tr. 353-356, 370-383).

Dr. Parkinson found indica-

tions of additional spotting during the course of this examination and gave her annother injection of Delalutin (Tr. 344, 370,
387; D. Ex. 804).
Mrs. Barson's pregnancy continued uneventfully although she
experienced another episode of spotting in October of 1972 and
received a third injection of Delalutin (Tr.270, 345; D. Ex.
804).

The plaintiff, Elizabeth Ann Barson, was born on March 26,

1973 with profound birth defects the most serious of which was
amelia--the total absence of arms (Tr. 347, 371-372; D. Ex. 804).

c.

The Pre-trial and Trial Proceedings.

On March 20, 1979 Elizabeth Ann Barson filed a civil complaint.
The complaint was later amended to seek both compensatory and
punitive damages for the birth defects she suffered, which were
allegedly caused by the administration of Delalutin during the
early pregnancy of her mother

-10-

(R.16-22).

Plaintiff alleged
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that Squibb was liable under the theories of negligence, breach
of warranty and strict liability because it failed to properly
test Delalutin and failed to warn that the drug was defective
since its use by pregnant women during the first trimester of
pregnancy increased the risk of birth defects.

(R.16-22).

The

plaintiff did not allege or offer any proof that Delalutin was
adulterated nor that the drug was defectively manufactured (Id.).
In several in limine motions made prior to trial, Squibb
sought to preclude the admission in evidence of the physician and
patient package inserts which were mandated by the FDA more than
five years after the use of Delalutin by the plaintiff's mother
(PR. 33; R. 553-554; P .Ex. 10 (n) et seg). 11 Squibb noted that
these FDA mandated warnings were hearsay when offered either for

..

the proposition that Delalutin was defective or that the drug was
responsible for the plaintiff's birth defects.

Further these

statements were not admissible under any exception to that rule.
U.R.E. 63.

Moreover, Squibb argued that even if these subse-

quently mandated warnings were admissible under the rules of
evidence they should be excluded under U.R.E. 51 because they
11

The physician package insert at issue read in pertinent

part:
There is no adequate evidence that such use
is effective [in the prevention of habitual
abortion or to treat threatened abortion] and
there is evidence of potential harm to the
fetus when such drugs are given during the
first four months of pregnancy (P.Ex. lO(q)).
The patient package insert (P.Ex lO(t)) first mandated in 1978
contained the same warning.
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amounted to subsequent remedial conduct (PR.34-37; R.553-554).
Squibb also asked the court to limit evidence on the question of
efficacy since such evidence was irrelevant on the issue of
liability (PR.62-64; Tr.263-266).
After hearing arguments during the pretrial, the trial court
instructed counsel for the plaintiff not to refer to subsequently
mandated package inserts in his opening statement (PR.53-54).
The court stated that the admissibility of these subsequent
warnings would be addressed during the course of the trial after
receipt of appropriate foundational evidence (PR.54).

The judge

declined Squibb's request to limit references to efficacy in the
opening,

but the court did caution that plaintiff's counsel

risked reversal if introduction of the evidence was not appropriate (PR.74).

During the course of the trial, the court per-

mitted the introduction of both classes of evidence causing
substantial prejudice to Squibb and creating many of the errors
complained of here.
The trial, which commenced on September 1, 1981 and continued
until October 1, 1981, consumed a total of 15 trial days. During
the course of the entire trial, plaintiff's counsel and experts
were unable to offer any study which demonstrated any specific
association between the administration of Delalutin and the
development of birth defects in animal or man.
instead,

They relied,

on studies relating to different products and other

inadmissible evidence in order to try to establish that Delalutin

-12-
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caused the plaintiff's injuries (P.Ex. 58; Tr.718, 721, 823, 869,
877, 890, 892, 1012-1018, 1863, 1929-1930, 2010, 2038).
For example, Dr. Alan K. Done, a pediatrician, was permitted
by the trial judge to testify as to world literature relating to
progestational agents, using a sununary of the articles and extrapolating data taken from them, over repeated objections of Squibb
(Tr.722-725; P.Ex. 58).

Much of this literature dealt with oral

contraceptives and hormonal pregnancy tests--not Delalutin (Tr.825).
Frequently, Dr. Done reinterpreted the data presented and came to
conclusions that differed from those of the authors.

He supported

this by stating that the people .whose conclusions he was reinterpreting were answering "a different question than the one I
have to answer for purposes of this Court" (Tr. 873).
Dr. Dane's

summary

Experience Reports
(Tr.841; P.Ex. 58).

exhibit

included

within

it

Drug

( "DER' s" ) submitted by Squibb to the FDA

12

No testimony was adduced from any witness

indicating that DER's, which could include such items as letters
from

lawyers

(Tr. 939),

were the type of evidence reasonably

relied upon by experts in forming opinions (Tr.935-942).

Although

the trial court refused to admit these DER's in evidence finding
12
DER's are anecdotal reports on drugs received by drug companies
from multiple sources including physicians, pharmacists, lawyers
and the general public (.Tr. 939}.
The reports frequently do not
assert that a particular drug caused a problem.
At best, they
relate the taking of a drug and contemporaneous or subsequent
adverse reactions (Tr.938-940).
Drug· companies, as required by
law, forward these routinely to the FDA.
21 C.F.R. § 310.300
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them to be hearsay and unreliable, the reports nevertheless were
impermissibly summarized by Dr. Done and placed before the jury
(Tr.842).
The trial court, despite pleas from the defendant, erroneously
permitted the question of Delalutin's efficacy to be placed in
issue before the jury (PR.62-64, Tr.761-763).
the plaintiff's case in chief,
plaintiff to

At the close of

the trial court permitted the

introduce as evidence on causation and product

defect not only all of the package inserts which predated the
administration of Delalutin to the plaintiff's mother, but also
all inserts subsequent to that time and up to the date of trial.
(D.

Ex. lO(p),

D.Ex. lO(t);

Tr.

1194-1197,

1319,

1321-1325,

1495-1496).
The package inserts assumed a dominant role in the trial.
These hearsay documents became in effect an absent governmental
expert witness upon which the plaintiff's attorneys and experts
repeatedly relied (Tr.

1053-1054).

This took on yet greater

importance in light of the failure to offer any direct evidence
between the administration of Delalutin and the development of
congenital

anomalies.

Virtually every Squibb

representative

called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and every defense
expert witness was improperly cross-examined by the plaintiff's
counsel
inserts.

about the post-administration changes in the package
This improper approach suggested that the FDA, this

country's public health expert, disagreed with any witness
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supporting either Delalutin's safety or efficacy (Tr. 1851, 1854,
1856, 1864, 1988, 1989, 1990).

Thus the issues of safety and

efficacy, the latter of which should not have been placed before
the jury in any case, were put before the jury in an extremely
prejudicial manner.
Addressing both the issue of Delalutin's safety and efficacy,
as well as the credibility of plaintiff's experts, the plaintiff's
attorney in rebuttal summation repeatedly used these FDA-mandated
warnings suggesting their "truth:"
I cannot believe that by continually repeating
some facts that somehow the truth of the
assertion of Squibb can be believed by this
jury.
It certainly wasn't believed ~ the
FDA .... All of the information that they've
tried to show you was certainly shown to
those agencies or to those organizations ....
Everything that Squibb had they showed, but
in spite of that what came out as revised
May 1979? . . . On the Squibb symbol ... on
the insert . . . [is] . . . "Warning . . . use of
progestational agents during the first four
months of pregnancy is not reconunended .... "
[T]hey say Dr. Nora is silly, ignorant, not
to be believed .... The FDA accepted it ....
What they say is "progestational agents have
been used with the beginning of the first
trimester of pregnancy in an attempt to
prevent habitual abortion or treat threatened
abortion. There is no adequate evidence that
such use is effective and there is evidence
of potential harm to the fetus when such
drugs are given during the first four months
of pregnancy." [Tr.2561-2563]
He then pointed out that the same language exists in the
inserts today, adding:
That's what it says, and it still says
it, and it's still on the inserts to this day
and it has not been removed, ... This is in
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May of 1979 and it still exists and it hasn't
been changed.
If it were so clear ... [that
there was no] ... significant relationship or
incidence between Delalutin and limb defects,
you can bet your bottom dollar that this
still wouldn't be there, if that were a fact.
Pardon me if I shout too much and get
too excited, but this is important.
It may
be important to Squibb, but it's important to
the children too, it's important to the
public, it's important enough for the FDA to
in the last paragraph of this warning that
I've been reading say that if the patient is
exposed to Delalutin during the first four
months of pregnancy or if she becomes pregnant
while taking this drug she should be apprised
of the potential risk to the fetus.
It says
it straight out, 1979.
[Tr.2563]
The error of injecting the FDA into the case as an absent
expert was compounded when the attorney for the plaintiff, in
closing,
drugs.

accused Squibb of selling both unsafe and ineffective
The attorney, after first stating that Squibb was "spending

thousands of dollars defending lawsuits and this lawsuit" rather
than making their product safe,

asked a rhetorical question

suggesting there was a "positive obligation of the company to
come in here with positive proof [that Delalutin was safe]"
(Tr.2569-2570; emphasis added).

Squibb objected to this improper

attempt to alter the burden of proof and the court sustained the
objection.

No curative instruction, however, was given (Tr.2570).

Squibb produced testimony

from

si~

outside experts and

several expert employees in the firm and presented a strong case
that Delalutin did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.

13

Evidence

13
Defendant offered in support of its position the testimonies
of Drs. Gary Berger, a board certified practicing OB/Gyn from
North Carolina, who is also board certified in preventive medicine,
(Cont'd)
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was also introduced that the dates the drug was administered
demonstrated that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff could
not have been caused by Delalutin, even if the drug was a teratogen,
because the date of conception occurred too early in relation to
the giving of this drug (Tr. 1534-1536, 1586, 1593-1594, 1724,
1725

1

1780

2288-2290,

I

1841, 1990 2172-21751 2208-2209 2264-2267 2286
2292). 14 Other evidence was introduced by Squibb
I

I

f

f

which tended to establish that Delalutin had been properly tested
prior to marketing and that the directions to the physician and
the warnings contained in them in 1972 were complete in light
of the state of scientific knowledge then available (Tr.1232-1233).
Additionally, expert testimony was proffered that Delalutin was
effective in preventing threatened abortion after Delalutin' s
efficacy had been challenged by the plaintiff (Tr .1800-1845).
13 (Cont'd)
public health and epidemiology (Tr. 1510, et seq.); Dr. Robert
Seegmiller, Ph.D. Professor of Zoology specializing in embryology
at Brigham Young University (Tr. 1710, et seg.); Dr. Leonard
Lerner, a former Squibb employee and endocrinologist from Jefferson
Medical School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Tr. 1888, et seq.);
Dr. Robert Franklin, a practicing board certified obstetrician
from Houston, Texas (Tr. 1795 et seq.); Dr. Robert L. Brent, a
board certified pediatrician from Jefferson Medical School,
Philadelphia and the editor of Teratology, the leading scientific
publication in the field (Tr. 2241 et seg. ) ; and Dr. Widikund
Lenz of Munster, Germany, perhaps the-world's foremost authority
on teratology and the relationship between drugs and birth defects
(Tr. 1725, 2142, et seg).
14
It was Squibb's position that the Delalutin was given after
the limbs would have formed so that the total absence of arms
necessarily meant that something other than the drug caused the
injury. Although this facet of the trial is not directly involved
in any of the issues on this appeal, Squibb mentions it here
because it was an extremely close issue which might well be
decided differently at a second trial.
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Squibb requested directed verdicts pursuant to U.R.C.P. 50
both at the close of the plaintiff's case (Tr.1462-1476,

2130)

and after all the evidence had been received (Tr.2440-2442).

One

of the grounds for the directed verdict was the fact that there
was no showing that animal teratology testing, even if undertaken,
would have provided Squibb with any data hinting of the potential
of Delalutin to cause limb reduction defects or,
teratological

defects

(Tr. 2442) .

These motions

indeed,
were

any

denied

(Tr.2442).
The court then discussed its legal instructions with counsel
(Tr.2452-2467).

Squibb requested that its Proposed Instruction lOA

be submitted to the jury defining strict liability in a prescription drug case

(Tr.2581).

As previously noted,

the plaintiff

neither claimed nor offered any proof that Squibb had manufactured
an adulterated drug or that Delalutin was defectively manufactured;
rather plaintiff claimed Squibb had failed to provide adequate
warnings in light of the scientific knowledge available in July 1972
(Tr.2594).

Thus any liability in the case could only be predicated

on the adequacy, or inadequacy, of the warnings in view of the
existing state of the art.
this limitation (R.

Proposed Instruction lOA contained

).

The court declined to limit the liability issue to the
adequacy of the warnings and instead submitted a general charge
on strict liability and breach of warranty to the jury (R.1279-1280,
1287).

The court's instruction permitted the jury to find the
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defendant liable if:

(1) the manufacturer was engaged in the

business of manufacturing and selling the drug;
reached the user without substantial change;
caused the injury.

(2) the drug

and (3) the drug

The trial court's other instructions further

reinforced the conclusion that a jury should find for the plaintiff
if i t was established that Delalutin was responsible for the
injuries regardless of the adequacy of the warning or the state
of scientific knowledge (R.1288-1289).

The defendant objected to

these instructions and also objected to the trial judge's failure
to charge the jury in the specific language of Squibb's Proposed
Request lOA {Tr.2581).
·The court submitted the case to the jury on all three of
plaintiff's liability theories,

namely,

negligence,

warranty and strict liability (R.1279-1280.

breach of

In argument to the

jury plaintiff's counsel made it clear that he was relying upon
_all three theories (Tr. 2471-2472).

The jury, after deliberating

returned a. verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant in the amount of $1,500,000

(Tr. 2585).

Since the

verdict was general in form, i t cannot be known upon what theory
or theories the jury relied in finding their verdict (R. 1302).

o.

The Post Trial Proceedings.

Following the verdict,

Squibb moved pursuant to U.R.C.P.

SO(b) and 59 for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in
the alternative for a new trial (R.1315-1317; Tr.2589).

Squibb

reasserted its position that the trial court erred in permitting
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the plaintiff to introduce evidence of FDA mandated package
inserts issued subsequent to the date Delalutin was administered
to the plaintiff's mother (Tr.2597).

Squibb also reiterated its

objections to various evidentiary rulings of the court and to the
jury Instructions (Tr.2593-2597).
On December 11, 1981, the trial court denied the motions
though recognizing that his ruling on the post-1972 inserts was
pivotal:
As to receiving package inserts after
July, 1972, I admit this probably gave me the
most problem during the course of the trial.
[Tr.2630]
The judge reserved decision on the motion for a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60 {Tr.2631).
on January 21, 1982, the trial court denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence
(R.1440-141).

The basis for the motion was a meeting of the

Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee to the FDA
on November 5 and 6, 1981.

The Committee, composed of the leading

authorities in the various fields of reproductive medicine,
unanimously recommended that the pregnancy warnings related to
progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone caproate

(Delalutin) be

withdrawn in light of the available medical evidence as to their
safety and efficacy.

Again, however, the court observed that the

question of whether Delalutin was a teratogen was a very close
question:

-20-
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After one month of trial this court does
not know whether Delalutin is teratogenic
during the first trimester of pregnancy. The
jury chose to believe those doctors who
believed that it is. [R.1440]
On February 22,
(R.1448).

1982 Squibb filed its Notice of Appeal

This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to

U.R.C.P. 72(a).

In this appeal, Squibb seeks a new trial because

of the following errors conuni tted by the trial court:

( 1) in

admitting subsequent FDA-mandated physician and patient inserts;
(2)

in improperly instructing the jury with regard to the elements

necessary to establish strict liability in tort and breach of
warranty in a drug case;

(3)

in permitting the issue of negligence

based on inadequate animal testing to be submitted to the jury;
and ( 4) in committing other prejudicial errors concerning the
admission of evidence and the conduct of the trial which resulted
in the jury verdict from which this appeal is taken.

Squibb also

seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FDA-MANDATED PACKAGE INSERTS ARE NOT
ADMISSIBLE BASED UPON BOTH EVIDENTIARY AND
POLICY GROUNDS.
A.

The Utah Rules of Evidence Forbid the Introduction of these FDA-Mandated Inserts Because They
Are Hearsay and Not Admissible in Evidence
Under Any Exception to U.R.E. 63.

1.

Introduction

When the plaintiff's mother received Delalutin injections in
July and August of 1972, no information had appeared in scientific
publications which suggested any association between progestational
agents generally and limb anomalies.

In mid-1973, however, the

FDA began receiving information which suggested that a question
of safety was raised by inferential evidence between the administration of certain progestins and cardiac anomalies.
27948 (October 10, 1973).

38 Fed. Reg.

Based on this preliminary information,

and fulfilling its role in the field of public health, the FDA
directed that no progestational agents should be given to women
during early pregnancy.

Squibb complied with the FDA directions

and all indications for use during pregnancy were deleted from
its package inserts (P.Ex. lO(p)).
Although Squibb did not market Delalutin for the prevention
of habitual and threatened abortion after December 1973, the FDA,
in July 1977, adopted additional regulations respecting package
inserts which contain the warnings introduced in evidence during
this case ( P. Ex. 10 ( q); P. Ex. 10 ( s) ) .
-22-

In mandating that al 1
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all drug companies marketing progestational agents provide certain
warnings in their package inserts, the FDA acknowledged that "it
[was] not possible to draw a cause and effect relationship"
between Delalutin and birth defects.

Report on Labeling Requirements for Progestational Drugs (October, 1977) at 4. 15 Nor did
the FDA find that Delalutin was an ineffective drug (Id. at 4-5).
When the FDA published the final regulations on requirements
for patient labeling on progestational drug products in October
1978, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs reiterated that no cause
and effect relationship had been established between the taking
of Delalutin and birth defects.

Specifically, the Commissioner

noted:
Although it is not possible to draw ~ cause
and effect relationship with progesterone or
hydroxyprogesterone [Delalutin] based on
these data, they do raise an element of
suspicion. A considerably larger study would
be required in order to rule out a positive
15

The FDA' s Obstetrics and Gynecology Advisory Committee in
fact recommended that progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone not be
included in the warning. The January 10, 1977 FDC Report ("Pink
Sheet") observed:
PROGESTERONES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM PROGESTAGEN BOX
WARNING was consensus of F.D.A's OB/Gyn Advisory Comte.
[sic] Jan. 6, at a meeting where Associate Dir. for New
Drug evaluation, Marion J. Finkel, M. D. submitted
proposed labeling warning to Comte. members
[Tr. 1884]

The OB/Gyn Advisory Group of the FDA has never indicated
that Delalutin was not efficacious (Tr. 1882).
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relationship.
(43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (October 13,
1978); emphasis added][l6]
Squibb complied with FDA directions in 1977 with respect to
physician package inserts and again in 1978 with respect to
patient package inserts (P.Ex. lO(s), lO(t)).

In both instances

language used in these warnings was mandated and approved by the
FDA (P. Ex. lO(s)).

These inserts were in use at the time of

trial (P.Ex. lO(q)).
Recently, the FDA Committee responsible for evaluating the
efficacy and safety of drugs used in pregnancy (including progesterone and Delalutin) has reconunended changes to the mandated
package insert for Delalutin· to modify the warnings the plaintiff
introduced into evidence (Tr.2610-2612, 2625).

Specifically, the

Cornmi ttee found that "the amended label should indicate that
progesterone and ... [Delalutin] ... do not appear to have any
significant teratogenic potential and the current labeling
16
In that same Federal Register Notice the FDA acknowledged
receipt of comments which noted "certain characteristics of
progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone ... [Delalutin] ... that
distinguished these drugs from the other progestional drug products
and warrant excluding progesterone and hydroxyprogesterone from
the warning about teratogenic risk. 11 43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (October
13, 1978). The FDA out of caution, however, concluded:
[T]here is not sufficient evidence to permit
the exclusion of any of the progestational
drug products from the patient labeling
requirements .... [at this time].
If more
information becomes available, that can be
relied upon to distinguish within the class,
certain progestational drug products may be
exempted from the patient labeling requirements.
[43 Fed. Reg. 47179 (October 13, 1978)]

-24-
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suggesting teratogenic potential of sex hormones,

[should]

be modified. 11 (Minutes of November 5-6, 1981 Meeting "Fertility
and Maternal Heal th Drugs Advisory Cornrni ttee, " Food and Drug
Ad.ministration ( 11 FDA Fertility Committee Minutes") at 17; Tr.26102612, 2625).

The FDA currently has its Conunittee's reconunendation

under advisement.

(Tr.2614)

As we noted previously, a substantial part of the plaintiff's
case rested on evidence of Squibb's subsequent FDA-mandated
precautionary package inserts for the drug Delalutin.

These

package inserts warned physicians and patients that Delalutin had
not been shown to be effective in preventing miscarriages and
that some studies suggested the danger of birth defects, including
limb defects, when pregnant women used progestins in the first
four months of pregnancy (P.Ex. lO(q) et seq.).
The relationship between the FDA' s formal statements on
Delalutin and other progestational agents and the plaintif.f' s
injuries is not at all clear.
was not explored at the trial.

The basis for the FDA's conclusion
The package inserts served as a

disembodied expert witness, not subject to cross-examination.
Although various rationales were offered for the acceptance of
these documents, it is evident that the plaintiff offered them
for their

11

truth"--i.e. Delalutin could cause birth defects--and

they were admitted into evidence by the court for that purpose
(Tr.1195-1196,

1297-1998,

1495-1496).

Since these statements

were presented to the jury as judgments by the FDA that Delalutin
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caused the plaintiff's injuries, they were hearsay evidence and
18
inadmissible except as provided in exceptions to U.R.E. 63.
Because hearsay evidence is not subject to cross-examination, any
exceptions permitting its admission must be based upon a determination that its trustworthiness and value significantly outweigh
the loss to the fact-finding process suffered when the right to
confrontation is eliminated.

Cf. State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313

{Utah 1975}; U.R.E. 63; 5 Wigmore, Evidence
Rev. 1974).
2.

~

1365 {Chadbourne

As will be shown, such guarantees do not exist here.

The FDA-Mandated Inserts Are Not Reports and Findings
of Public Officials Under U.R.E. 63(15}

In Utah the reports and findings of public officials are
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
Subject to . . . [notice, ] factual data
contained in written reports or findings of
fact made by a public official of the United
States or of a state or territory of the
United States, if the judge finds that the
making thereof was within the scope of the
duty of such official and that it was his
duty {a) to perform the act reported, or
{b) to observe the act, condition or event
reported, or {c) to investigate the facts
concerning the act, condition or event and to
make findings or draw conclusion based on
such investigation.
[U.R.E. 63 (15); emphasis
added]
By its terms, U.R.E. 63 (15) does not permit receipt of these
package inserts because they do not represent factual data, but
18
The trial judge never actually advised the litigants under
what exception to the hearsay rule he was permitting their introduction. Compare Tr.1193-1197, 1495-1496 with PR.SO.

-26Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rather opinions by a public body.

This Court has held that

receipt of reports containing such opinions is beyond the scope
of the rule.
738,

740

See Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d

(Utah 1971); Wilson v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 23

P.2d 921, 923-924 (Utah 1933); Continental Nat. Bank v. Naylor,
179 P. 67, 71 (Utah 1919).

See also City of Stockton v. Vote 244

P. 609, 620-622 (Cal. App. 1926).
In Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d at 740, this
Court clearly differentiated between public reports presenting
factual data and those containing opinions.

In that case the

plaintiffs had sought to introduce an order of the Utah Public
Service Commission directing that improvements be made at a grade
crossing where the plaintiff's son had been killed.

In sustaining

the trial court's order excluding this evidence the Court observed:
Under Rule 63 (15), U.R.E., a report of
finding of a public official such as the
order of the Public Service-Commission is
deemed admissible in evidence. However, the
explanatory note states:
. . . it is not designed to permit
the admission of a judgment or
finding of fact of the court or
administrative body for the purpose
of proving the matters upon which
such judgment or finding of fact
were based.
[T]his exception ~
not designed to admit opinions or
conclusions of officials appearing
in official reports, but only the
admissions of statements of fact
appearing therein.
[Bridges, 488
P.2d at 740; emphasis added]
The result reached in Bridges is indicative of a consistent
policy in State and Federal courts that while factual findings by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

public officials themselves may be admitted, conclusions of those
officials should not.

In Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,

637 F.2d 87, 94 {2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit directly faced
the question of whether FDA mandated warnings were admissible
pursuant to the Federal "public records" exception, Fed. R. Evid.
803{8)(C). 19

The plaintiff in Lindsay sought to introduce, on

the issue of causation, similar types of FDA mandated physician
and patient warnings for oral contraceptives.

In specifically

rejecting the admission of this evidence as a hearsay exception
the court observed:
[I]nsofar as the labeling changes may be said
to 'reflect' FDA conclusions, they do not
fall readily within the public record hearsay
exception . . . since they deal with medical
opinions not facts.
[Lindsav v. Ortho Pharmaceutical~., 637 F.2d at 94]
Similarly, in City of New York v. Pullman,

Inc.,

662 F.2d

910 {2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to permit receipt of a staff report of the Urban Mass Transit
Administration ( "UMTA 11
procedure

for

)

commenting on the safety of a repair

undercarriages

on New York City subway cars.

Although the court recognized that the governmental agency had a
mandated duty to investigate unsafe conditions where Federal

•
19
Fed. R. Ev id. 803 { 8) { c) permits the receipt of "records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth ... {C) in civil actions and
proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority rendered by law, unless the sources of
information or circumstances indicate the lack of trustworthiness"
(Emphasis added).
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financing of subway cars was involved, it rejected the findings
of this Federal agency as appropriate evidence in a products
liability case.

The judges worried that the report "would have

been presented to the jury in an 'aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness' which would have not been commensurate with its
actual reliability."
at 915.

City of New York v. Pullman, .!!!£., 662 F.2d

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505

F.Supp. 1125, 1147-1150 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Similar concerns about the reliability of information contained in government reports have caused Federal trial courts to
reject conclusions of government fact-finders because these
findings and conclusions involved opinions based upon scientific
facts which were in the process of evolution and were therefore
not reliable.

See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 518 F.Supp.

1387 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zenith v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., 505 F.Supp. at 1148-1150.
This is precisely the case here.

These mandated post-

administration package inserts reflect the FDA's opinions and not
its factual findings.

The agency made its judgments based upon

incomplete data which suggested that there might be an association
between progestational agents and birth defects.

The FDA, in its

capacity as a guardian of the public heal th, is called upon to
make judgments based on the evolving state of medical knowledge
and to act based on these incomplete data.

Courts, on the other

hand, must address questions of defining true cause and effect
based on verified data with accompanying indicia of reliability.
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3.

The FDA-Mandated Inserts Are Not Adoptive Admissions
Under U.R.E. 63(8)

The trial judge correctly recognized that statements mandated
by governmental agencies such as the FDA could not constitute
admissions by Squibb (PR.SO}. Nevertheless, the introduction of
the package inserts was

defend~d

by the plaintiff in later proceed-

ings on that basis (Tr.2561-2563).
In State v. Carlsen,
U.S.

denied,

638 P.2d 512,

----

I

514 (Utah 1981), cert.

102 s.ct. 1469 (1982), this Court

recognized that an adoptive admission by a party, pursuant to
U.R.E. 63(8), should be found only where the individual or entity
against which the admission is offered has had a meaningful
opportunity and interest in confronting or denying it.

These

opportunities and interests were not present in this case.
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 352,
355 ( e),

provides

package inserts.

the FDA with plenary power respecting drug
Any drug manufacturer declining to follow FDA

labeling directives is subject to regulatory action which may
include: seizure of the drug product, injunctive action or criminal
sanctions.

21

Second Circuit,

U. S . C .

§ § 3 31 ( c ) - { d) ,

332 ( a ) ,

333 ,

3 34 .

The

in recognizing that power, found i t particularly

inappropriate to consider labeling changes by drug companies as
admissions against them.

Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical .£2.!:E,.,

637 F.2d 87 {2d Cir. 1980).

Rather, the court found that "[i]n

view of the control over label terminology exercisable by the FDA
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... we question whether a change in language should be construed
as a voluntary admission by the manufacturer."
94.

Id., 637 F. 2d at

See also, Vockie v. General Motors~., 66 F.R.D. 57, 60-62

{E.D.Pa.), aff'd 523 F.2d 1052 {3d Cir. 1975); International Paper
Co. v.

Delaware~

H.R. Corp., 73 F.Supp. 30, 35 {N.D.N.Y. 1938).

The rationale justifying an adoptive admission·is entirely
missing when statements are made under the direction of a regulatory body.

This is so because the statements themselves are not

voluntary and therefore the alleged declarant's adoption of them
is open to substantial doubt.
Delaware

&

H.R.

~.,

In International Paper Co. v.

73 F.Supp.

at 35, the district judge

recognized that the defendant's use of a tariff rate symbol
mandated by the Interstate Commerce Commission could not be
regarded as an adoptive admission, finding:
This alleged change is not in the nature
of an admission for an admission is something
voluntarily said or perhaps done.
Where, as here, the person charged with
the alleged admission is compelled to use the
sYI!1bol in question £y the requirements of
public policy, whether he will .2.I not, it
loses its character ~ ~ voluntary act and
therefore loses any force it might otherwise
have as an admission.
(73 F.Supp. at 35;
emphasis added][20]
20
Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 {8th Cir. 1977), a case
which was cited in support of the plaintiff's position during
post-trial motions, did pernti t the introduction of a recall
letter mandated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. The basis for the introduction of that recall letter,
however, was that it was affirmatively adopted by one of the
defendant's engineers who had previously discussed the design
problems identified by the government.
Additionally, other
substantial evidence existed which permitted the introduction of
the recall le~ter as an admission.
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The difficulty in viewing these mandated warnings as admissions is compounded when the purported adoption is based upon
silence.

In numerous Federal cases interpreting Fed. R. Evid.

80l{d)(2)(C), a rule strikingly similar to U.R.E. 63(8), courts
have found that to establish an admission by silence the proponent
must demonstrate not only that a party has heard the accusation
but also that "the circumstances are such that dissent would in
ordinary experience have been expressed if the conununication had
not been correct."
(2d Cir.

1976),

Unite.d States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874 at 877

quoting 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1071 (Chadbourne

Rev. 1972)); Zenith

Radio~·

F.Supp. at 1243-1245.

v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505

21

What is apparent from a review of this record is that the
FDA never made affirmative factual findings that Delalutin caused

birth defects.

Rather,

the FDA acknowledged that no cause and

21
During the course of argument whether these warnings should
be permitted in evidence, counsel for the plaintiff suggested
that Squibb could have disclaimed its belief in the accuracy of
the mandated warnings by adopting labeling similar to that which
is contained on cigarette packaging--"Warning: The Surgeon
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to
Your Health."
(Tr.1323) Elemental research discloses that the
warning mandated on cigarette packages is specifically governed
by Section 4 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
15 u.s.c. § 1333. That statute makes it "unlawful for any person
to manufacture ... any cigarette the package of which fails to
bear the following statement:
'Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined that Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.'"
The subsequent section, 15 U.S. C. § 1334, provides that "No
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by § 1333 of this type shall be required on any cigarette
package."
For a brief review of other mandated warnings on
cigarette labeling, see Brown ~ Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Engman, 1975-2 CCH Trade Cas. ~ 60,607 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1975).
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effect relationship had been established between Delalutin and
possible birth defects.

43 Fed. Reg. 47178 (Oct. 13, 1978).

Moreover, the record reveals that indications for use in pregnancy
had been withdrawn in 1973 (P.Ex. lO(m)).

Since the mandated

warnings pertained to an indication for which the drug had not
been marketed for four years,

Squibb also had no incentive,

reason, or, indeed, standing in 1977 to dispute the imposition of
the mandated warnings which in effect pertained to a drug use for
which Delalutin was not marketed in 1977.
Finally, as we have noted, the information contained in the
mandated inserts introduced at trial was not only hearsay but was
also largely non-factual in nature (P.Ex.lO(t)).

The inserts

summarize judgments reported in medical periodicals suggesting an
association,

based on limited statistical data, between the

taking of some progestogins during early pregnancy and an increased
risk of birth defects.

The introduction of these FDA warnings in

evidence when they themselves incorporate additional hearsay,
raises other evidentiary questions which further mandate their
exclusion under Utah law.
In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), this court
observed that Utah had not adopted the learned treatise rule when
it enacted its evidence code.

The receipt of the contents of these

medical articles contained in the FDA mandated warnings raises the
spectre of multiple hearsay, some of which is inadmissible because

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-33Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it is in the nature of an absent expert's opinion. 22
and 63(31)

Cf. U.R.E. 66

(the learned treatise rule which was not adopted).

In short then, none of the predicates for the receipt of
this evidence as an admission exist.

Moreover,

none of the

policies served by the admission of such evidence are furthered.
Rather, it appears that the receipt of this evidence would violate
many of the policies prominent in this State's evidence rules.
The trial judge clearly declined to admit these inserts as admissions.

This court should also decline any post trial invitation

to admit them on that basis.
B.

The Policy Which Precludes Admission of
Subsequent Remedial Measures Pursuant to
U.R.E. 51 Renders These Mandated FDA
Warnings Inadmissible.

The strong public policy underlying the exclusion of hearsay
is not the only policy militating against admission of these FDA
mandated warnings.
FDA' s

A drug company's enforced compliance with the

mandates in the form of changed labeling is a form of

remedial measure.

U.R.E. 51

guarantees

that modifying drug

labeling or taking other remedial measures will not be admissible
as proof of a breach of duty:
When after the occurrence of an event
remedial or precautionary measures are taken,
which, if taken previously would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur,
evidence of such subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event.
22
State v. Clayton, No. 82-17518 (Utah 1982) (Slip Opinion)
does not alter the ruling in Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 533.
The FDA warnings were not relied upon by the plaintiff's experts,
but were instead introduced in evidence for their truth.
See
Coulter v. Stewart, 642 P.2d 602 (N.M. 1982).
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U.R.E. 51 was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 1971 and
reflects this State's continued adherence to the common law rule
that evidence of subsequent remedial or precautionary measures is
inadmissible to demonstrate that the defendant was negligent, the
condition was previously unsafe, or that the defendant admitted
its culpability in taking those steps.

See
--

Potter v. Dr. W.H.

--

Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 103 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah 1940);
Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner,

Inc., 38 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah

1934); Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 27 P.2d 468, 474
(Utah 1933).

This policy, which has remained in effect for over

50 years, endorses
[t]he general rule that where a dangerous or
defective appliance is alleged to have resulted
in an injury for which damges are sought to
be recovered, evidence that subsequent to the
accident changes or repairs thereof or thereto
were made is inadmissible to show antecedent
negligence or as an admission of negligence
on the particular occasion in question ....
45 c. J. 1232.
[ Christenson v. Utah Rapid
Transit Co., 27 P.2d at 474][23]
The Utah Rules of Evidence in effect today also recognize
that evidence of subsequent precautions often has little to do
with the issue of whether a product was in fact harmful in the
first place.

This Court has on occasion defined the evidence

question raised in U.R.E. 51 as one of relevance:
23

The Corpus Juris section approved by the court in Christenson
specifically states that "evidence of such repairs or changes
made or precautions taken is not admissible to show the dangerous
character of a place, method, or appliance at the time of the
accident .... " 45 C.J. 1234-1235.
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The fact that some months after appellant's injury respondent added to its instructions for the use of its products the employment of rubber gloves does not establish or
tend to establish knowledge of the danger at
the time of injury or that any ingredient was
then harmful.
[Bennett v. Pilot Products
co., 235 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1951); emphasis
added]
The plaintiff argued at trial that this exclusionary rule
should not apply because fault or culpability is not an issue in
a strict liability case.

This premise ignors the fact that the

theory of liability presented to the jury in this case involved a
failure to warn of known or reasonably knowable dangers.
The Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, which deals with the
concept of strict liability, has been adopted by Utah.
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);

Ernest~-

Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 24
v.

Ingersoll-Rand Co.,

628 P.2d at 1303-04,

Mulherin
Hahn,

In Mulherin

this Court while

affirming its adherence to the Restatement also found that comparative negligence principles were applicable in strict liability
cases to diminish recovery by a plaintiff.

It ruled that while

there might "be semantic difficulties in comparing strict liability
and negligence ... we believe that judges and juries will have no
difficult in assigning the relative responsibility each is to

24
The Utah Supreme Court specifically adopted Comments g and
n to § 402A which provide defenses to strict liability charges.

-36-
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bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such
comparison are relative fault and relative causation. 11
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d at 1304.

Mulherin

A review of these two

recent products liability cases shows that Utah does not equate
strict liability with absolute liability.

Neither, of course,

does the Restatement, particularly when dealing with drug products.
The Restatement of Torts (2d)

§

402A dramatically differenti-

ates between liability standards to be applied in cases involving
drug products and those involving commercial products generally.
As discussed in Point II, infra, where adequacy of the warning is
at issue,

the duty

11

is one of reasonable care, regardless of

whether the theory pled is negligence,
strict liability in tort."

implied warranty, or

Smith v. E. R.

Squibb~

Sons, Inc.,

273 N.W.2d 476, 479-480 (Mich. 1979).
It is clear, then, that if this court continues its adherence
to the principles in the Restatement of Torts (2d)

§

402A and

adopts Comments h, j and k, Squibb's duty to warn will be measured
by traditional concepts of negligence.

Therefore, by its terms

U.R.E. 51 would be applicable to this case.
While we believe that this Court will adopt Comments h, j
and k as the law in this State (see Point II, infra), the Court
should not get the misimpression that the policy expressed in
U.R.E. 51 is inapplicable where strict liability is involved.

Al though no Utah decision has dealt with the application of
U.R.E. 51 in a strict liability case, ample precedent, both in
other States having similar exclusionary rules and in the Federal
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courts under Fed. R. Evid. 407 {a rule similar to U.R.E. 51),
demonstrates

that the policies expressed in U. R. E. 51 should

apply to strict liability.
In Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 449 U.S. U.S. 1080 (1981), a plaintiff's judgment in
a drug products case was reversed because a subsequently revised
and expanded warning distributed with the prescription drug
Cleocin,

an antibiotic associated with the side effect of severe

diarrhea, was improperly admitted into evidence to prove that an
earlier warning was inadequate.

The court found that the revised
25
insert was a remedial measure protected by Fed. R. Evid. 407.
Id. at 853.
25
Fed. R. Evid. 407 provides that:
When after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event.
This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control,
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.

According to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Federal Evidence Rules, Rule 407 rests on two grounds:
(1) The conduct is not in fact an admission,
since the conduct is equally consistent with
injury by mere accident or through contributory
negligence .... (2~ The other, and~ impressive,
ground for exclusion rests 2.!! ~ social policy
of en~ouraging people to take, or at least
not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety ....
[56 F.R.D.
183 at 225-226 (1973); emphasis added]
-38-
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The Werner court specifically rejected plaintiff's argument
that the subsequent warning regarding Cleocin should be admissible
.because the complaint included a "strict liability" claim.

The

plaintiff argued that strict liability claims are not covered by
the phrase "negligence or culpable conduct" in Fed. R. Evid. 407.
The court, however, took a broader view of this term.

The Federal

appeals court found that the issue in a failure to warn case was
the same whether the theory was negligence or strict liability-was the warning adequate?
Under a negligence theory the issue is whether
the defendant exercised due care in formulating
and updating the warning, while under a
strict liability theory the issue is whether
the lack of a proper warning made the product
unreasonably dangerous.
Though phrased
differently the issue under either theory is
essentially the ~: was the warning adequate?
[Werner Vo Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d at 858;
emphasis added]
The Fourth Circuit concluded that to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a failure to warn case involving an
unavoidably dangerous drug "would promote substance over form"
and would subvert the policy behind excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
858.

Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d at

Using the same reasoning, it also rejected the plaintiff's

pr~f fer

of a subsequent warning to prove breach of an express

warranty,

to prove causation, or to show that the plaintiff was

entitled to punitive damages:
(W]e hold, for the same reasons stated in our
refusal to allow the 1975 warning to come in
to prove strict liability, that the policy
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behind Rule 407 does not allow for a new
exception to prove-c~ation, b--re-ach . o~
express warranty 2E entitlement to punitive
damages on the facts of this case. (628 F.2d
at 858-859; emphasis added]
The court acknowledged plaintiff's argument, that the policy
behind Fed.

R. Evid. 407 would not be served by excluding the

evidence since the subsequent warning was required by the FDA,
had a "surface plausibility. 11

According to the court, however,

the argument overlooked the dual responsibility for preparing
warnings for prescription drugs.

Werner, 628 F.2d at 859.

In addition to the FDA' s broad regulatory sanctions, the
agency relies on the free exchange of information from physicians
and pharmaceutical companies relating to the experience gained in
the clinical use of drugs together with voluntary compliance and
open discussion in determining the content of warnings and advertising for prescription drugs.

628 F.2d at 859.

Furthermore,

FDA regulations allow drug companies to change the labels and
warnings accompanying their products without prior FDA approval
where new side effects are discovered by the company.

21 C.F.R.

§ 314.8(d)-(e).

The appellate court reasoned that if subsequent warnings
were admitted simply because either the FDA required, or might
have required the change, then drug companies would be discouraged
from taking early action on their own and from fully participating
in voluntary compliance procedures.

Werner, 628 F.2d at 859.

It

concluded that the FDA's regulatory power should not be viewed as
conflicting with the protective policy of Fed.

R. Evid. 407:

-40Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The FDA's regulations and policies encourage
early unilateral action by the drug companies
to improve their warnings, and Rule 407
promotes the same goal.
We therefore hold
that FDA regulations in the area of drug
labeling do not require a new exception to
Rule 407.
Indeed, to find such an exception
would subvert the policy goals of both Rule 407
and FDA Regulations 314.8(d)-(e). [Werner,
628 F.2d at 860; emphasis added]
Federal courts in virtually every circuit have agreed with
the Werner case and have applied Fed. R. Evid. 407 to exclude
subsequent remedial conduct in cases based on strict liability. 26
The policy expressed in Werner that subsequently mandated warnings
are inappropriate evidence when offered to establish causation is
also in agreement with the overwhelming majority of State courts
26
Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978)
cert. denied 440 U. s. 116 ( 1979) (evidence of post-accident
repairs to machine excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 407 in strict
liability case); Cann v. Ford Motor Company, 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied. _ _ U.S. _ _ , 102 S.Ct. 2036 (1982) (proffer
rejected of subsequent modification of auto transmission design
and amendment of owner's manual); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
£2!:E_., 637 F.2d at 92-94 (admission of subsequent FDA - mandated
package inserts required reversal of the plaintiff's judgment
under Fed. R. Evid. 407, among other reasons); Knight v. Otis
Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of subsequent
repair to-elevator excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 407); Bauman v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980)
(reversal required because of admission into evidence of subsequent
changes in design of door latch); Oberst v. International Harvester
Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 863 (7th cir. 1980) (evidence of post-accident
change in bunk restraint for truck sleeping compartment excluded
in strict liability case).
Among federal courts, only the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has found the exclusionary rule inapplicable in strict
liability cases. Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, 552 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1977). However, the Utah Supreme
Court has previously rejected the Eighth Circuit's no-fault
approach to strict liability which is reflected in Melia v. Ford
Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975). See Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 628 P.2d at 1304.
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which have rules similar to U.R.E. 51 and which have considered
.
.
27
t h is issue.
Emblematic of the reasoning employed by these State courts
is the decision in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,
N.E.2d 541

(Ind.

Ct. App. 1979).

388

There the Indiana appellate

court was faced with a case almost identical to this one.

Chapman,

the plaintiff, had sued the drug company for personal injuries
suffered as a result of her taking an oral contraceptive manufactured by the company.

The complaint, which alleged strict tort

liability under the Restatement as well as breach of warranty and
negligence, charged that Ortho had failed to adequately warn of
the increased risk of blood clotting associated with the use of
its oral contraceptives.
27
Ortho Pharmaceutical ~· v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) (excluding drug warnings); Smith v. E.R. Squibb~
Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. 1979) (Michigan Evidence Rule,
patterned on Fed. R. Evid. 407, invoked to exclude from evidence
the fact that warnings packaged with the drug Renografin - 60, a
die injected into the veins of x-ray patients, had been made more
explicit in the years following the injury alleged to be attributed
to the drug); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., Inc., 266 A.2d 140
(N.J. App. Div. 1970) (modification of seat belt snap not admissible
in action alleging defect in belt); E. G. LaMonica v. Outboard
Marine Corp. , 355 N. E. 2d 533 (Ohio l976); Simms v. Southeast
Texas Methodist Hospital, 535 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
{subsequent drug package warning and FDA regulation excluded as
evidence of causation: 11 admission of evidence of subsequent
precautionary or safety measures for the purpose of establishing
causation would discourage the taking of remedial measures after
the accident as effectively as will the reception of such evidence
on the issue of negligence"); Hayson v. Coleman Lantern Co.,
Inc., 573 P.2d 785 {Wash. 1978) (evidence of post-accident Changes
and instructions for using Coleman stove excluded in strict
liability case); Krueger v. Tappan Co., 311 N.W.2d 219 (Wisc. Ct.
App. 1981) (evidence of subsequent warnings regarding the use of
stove excluded in strict liability case).
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The Indiana court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
rule proscribing the admission of subsequent remedial conduct is
unnecessary in strict liability cases.

In addition to endorsing

the policy of encouraging subsequent remedial measures the court
found that exclusion of such conduct is also based on relevance
concepts.

The court observed:
Al though courts have emphasized the
public policy considerations in applying the
rule, these considerations are not its keystone.
Rather, lack of probative value is the fundamental reason for excluding such evidence ...
(citation omitted) .... A danger particularly
relevant to the present case is that a jury,
influenced by hindsight evidence, might apply
an.artifically high standard in determining
the adequacy of warnings .... Even contemporary
corporate mass-producers are entitled to be
judged by a fair standard.
The evidence in this case presented the
jury with a very close question regarding the
adequacy of Ortho's warnings. Therefore, we
cannot say the error in admitting this evidence
was harmless. [Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 561-562][28]

28
The principal case that does not follow the rule excluding
subsequent remedial measures in actions involving strict liability
is Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal.
197sr:- In that case the CaliforniaSupreme Court held that
culpability is not an issue in a strict liability case and,
consequently, a rule which operates to exclude subsequent remedial
measures does not apply.
Ault asserted that the policy considerations behind the
exclusionary rule are inapplicable because:
The contemporary corporate mass producer of
goods, the normal products liability defendant,
manufactures ten of thousands of uni ts of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest
that such a producer will forego making
improvements in its product and risk enumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse
(Cont'd)
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Absent compelling evidence establishing the lack of social
utility in excluding subsequent remedial conduct in strict liability
cases, this Court should not depart from its long standing policy
of excluding such conduct to establish either causation or fault.

c.

None of the Judicially Created Exceptions to
Evidence Rules Precluding the Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Conduct Are Relevant Here.

While counsel for the plaintiff clearly exploited the post1972 FDA mandated package inserts before the jury on the issue of
causation,

they have argued in pre-and post-trial proceedings

that the evidence was relevant on the "feasibility" of preparing
cautionary warnings.

Obviously, there has never been an issue in

this case as to the general feasibility, from a physical standpoint,
of preparing and inserting printed warnings in drug packages.

It

is also obvious that later inserts do not establish the feasibility
of imparting the information contained on them in earlier inserts
28 {Cont'd)
affect upon its public image, simply because
evidence of adoption of such improvement may
be admitted in an action founded on strict
liability for recovery of an injury that
preceded the improvement.
[Ault, 528 P.2d at
1152]
-Common sense dictates that this conclusion is wrong. Beyond the
relevance questions raised by this Court in Bennett v. Pilot
Products Co., 235 P.2d at 527, and by courts in other jurisdictions in cases such as Chapman, absence of the exclusionary rule
would discourage a free exchange of information between the FDA
and the heal th care providers - pharmaceutical companies and
physicians. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d at 859. See also
Smith v. E.R. Squibb~ Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 481. Beside the
Eighth Circuit, New York has followed the Ault rule. Caprara v.
Chrysler f.2..EE., 417 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1981). - -
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because that information may not have been known or knowable at
.
29
t h e time.
Courts which have dealt with this exclusionary rule inevitably
have been faced with requests by parties to suspend its operation
purportedly to establish feasibility of precautionary measures,
ownership or control.

In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,

for example, the Indiana appellate court rejected the plaintiffs
assertion that subsequent FDA mandated warnings were relevant on
the issue of feasibility.

In fact, the court found the argument

to be transparent observing:
There is no need for the plaintiff to prove
the defendant's practical ability to print
warnings.
The defendant never claimed it
could not.
If the evidence was offered to
show an example of a reasonable mode of
conveying a warning, it is irrelevant because
there was as a matter of law no duty to
directly warn the patient during the time in
question.
If the purpose of showing a caution
which could have been made referred to the
content, then it was clearly an attempt to
prove that "because the world grows wiser as
it gets older, therefore it was foolish
before 11 • • • • (citations omitted) .... This is
exactly what the exclusionary rule proscribes.
[Chapman, 388 N.E. 20 at 560][30]
29
The trial testimony reveals that no evidence establishing an
association, let alone a cause and effect relationship, between
the use of progestational agents and limb reduction defects was
in existence in July 1972 when Delalutin was administered to the
plaintiff's mother (Tr.10).
Dr. Nora one of the plaintiff's
experts, testified that he first presented such associational
evidence to the scientific community during the summer of 1973
(P.Ex.764; Tr.1063).
30
The danger of permitting receipt of subsequent warnings
on such insubstantial issues has been discussed by numerous
commentators.
Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence-United
States
Rules,
~ 407 [01] for example observe:
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The

assertion by counsel for the plaintiffs that these

post-1972 warnings were introduced to show feasibility is pretextual
and shou.ld be rejected by this Court.

The same is true of the

plaintiff's argument that these package inserts are relevant on
the issues of knowledge and, thus, defect in 1972 when the drug
was used.
In sum, the package inserts and related documents are plainly
hearsay which the trial court received for their "truth" over
strenuous and repeated objection by Squibb, in contravention of
U.R.E. 63.

The evidence was consistently used to suggest that

Delalutin was unsafe and that it caused plaintiff's injuries. In
30 (Cont'd)
[T]his exception is troublesome because the feasibility
of a precaution may bear on whether it was negligent
not to have taken the precaution; thus, negligence and
feasibility are often not distant issues
See also McCormick, Evidence § 275 at 668-669 (2d Ed. 1972) also
warns courts to be wary of pretextual attempts to defeat the
public policy expressed in rules such as U.R.E. 51.
Professor
McCormick observes:
[T]he extrinsic policy of encouraging remedial
safety measures is the predominant reason for
holding evidence of these measures to be privileged.
It is apparent that the free admission of such
evidence for purposes other than as admissions of
negligence is likely to defeat this paramountpo~icy.
It is submitted that before admitting the
evidence for any of these other purposes, the
court should be satisfied that the issue on which
it is offered is of substantra1-rroportance-and is
actually, and not merely formally in dispute, that
the plaintiff cannot establish the fact to be
inferred conveniently ~ other proof, and ££!!.::
sequently that the need for the ev~dence outweighs
the danger of its misuse.
[Emphasis added]
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permitting this evidence to be introduced the court also disregarded
the policy expressed in U.R.E. 51 which forbids the introduction
of subsequent remedial conduct to establish the liability of the
actor.

These errors are so substantial that they require reversal

of the judgment below and directions that another trial be conducted.
D.

Even Assuming This Incompetent Evidence to be
Admissible, Rules of Relevancy and Judicial
Discretion Mandate its Exclusion.

U.R.E. 45 reflects a balancing process for determining the
admissibility of evidence which, though perhaps marginally competent
and relevant,

has a

substantial capacity to confuse the fact

finder or create undue prejudice in excess of its legitimate
probative value.

Terry v.

Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Inst.,

P.2d 314, 323-325 (Utah 1979); Watkins v. Utah
Co-Op., 251 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 1952).

31

Poultry~

605

Farmers

This balancing approach

has been specifically employed to exclude FDA mandated warnings
in drug product liability cases tried in Federal courts.

Lindsay

v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d at 94; Skill v. Martinez,
91 F.R.D.

at 510.

Cf. Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66

F.R.D. at 86.
31
Fed. R. Evid. 403, which is similar to U.R.E. 45, provides
that "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by conditions
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless preparation of cumulative
evidence." Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403, courts have excluded
evidence found to be marginally relevant when its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and
confusion.
See City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d a~
915; Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical~., 637 F.2d at 94; Skill
v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 510 (D.N.J. 1981); Apicella v. McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Even assuming that these warnings are competent and have
relevance, it is of a most attenuated sort.

If these FDA warnings

constituted competent and relevant evidence, which they do not,
their proper contribution to the resolution of the issues in this
case was small.

Yet the opportunity for confusing the fact

finder was great.

This ground is sufficient in itself to cause a

court to exclude the evidence.
Mercantile,

Inst.,

U.R.E. 45; Terry v. Zions Co-Op.

605 P.2d 314, 323-325 (Utah 1979).

The trial

court's failure to exclude these warnings based on the balancing
test expressed in U.R.E. 45 was an abuse of discretion requiring
a reversal.

Terry, 605 P.2d at 325.

The plaintiff has suggested that the subsequent FDA warnings
were relevant on the issue of feasibility and to establish knowledge.

In Terry v.

323-325, however,
the evidence,

Zions Co-Op Mercantile Inst.,

605 P.2d at

this court found that the probative value of

even when crucial,

must be weighed against the

disadvantageous effects of confusing issues before the jury or
the creation of undue prejudice.
Poultry~

See also,

Watkins v.

Utah

Farmers co-Op, 251 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 1952).

The record taken as a whole demonstrates that even if an
argument can be made for the admissibility of the FDA warnings,
their use by plaintiff's counsel resulted in massive prejudice to
Squibb.

This is especially true where,

as here,

information

about the regulatory objectives of the FDA were not placed before
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the jury.

Rather the jury was left with the impression that a

Federal regulatory agency made an affirmative judgment that use
of Delalutin by pregnant women led to an elevated incidence of
birth defects.

The FDA, it should be remembered, was focusing on

its duty to bring any possible health risk to the attention of
the public and specifically was not making detailed scientific
judgments about cause and effect relationships concerning progestins
in general and certainly not Delalutin in particular.

Its perspec-

tive in mandating these warnings further militates against their
receipt in evidence.

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.

Ind. Co., Inc., 505 F.Supp. at 1147-1150.
Because of the serious prejudice which Squibb would suffer
when these inserts would,
against it,

in effect,

be permitted to testify

and given the marginal relevance of the warnings on

issues presented to the jury,
exclude them as evidence.

The judge's failure to do so, despite

repeated objections by Squibb,
and requires a

the trial court had a duty to

irreparably harmed the defendant

reversal of the judgment.

Zions co-Op Mercantile Inst.,

U.R.E. 45; Terry v.

605 P.2d at 323-325; Watkins v.

Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-Op, 251 P.2d 667.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE SO VAGUE
AND MISLEADING THAT THE JURY COULD HAVE JUDGED
SQUIBB UNDER THE ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF ABSOLUTE
LIABILITY.
The case was submitted to the jury on three theories of
liability:

negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability.

In strict liability or breach of warranty cases involving prescription drugs, where improper manufacture is not alleged, defect can
only relate to the adequacy of the warning.

This in turn can

only be based on the state of knowledge--actual or constructive-available to the manufacturer at the time the drug was used.
Restatement of Torts (2d),
case,

§ 402A Comments h,

j and k.

the court refused to so instruct the jury.

In this

Rather,

the

court instructed the jury that liability could be imposed without
any regard to the adequacy of the warning.
substantial error.

This constitutes a

The error was compounded by submitting the

case to the jury on three different theories of liability, though
each was based upon the same question--the adequacy of the warnings.
Since the elements required to prove the inadequacy of the warning
under each of the theories are virtually identical, the charge
was unnecessarily repetitious and confusing.
The erroneous and misleading instructions, to which Squibb
took exception, were prejudicial to the defendant since they had
the capacity to affect the outcome of the trial.
is entitled to a new trial.

See,

-so-

~.,

As such, Squibb

Watters v. Querry, 588
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P.2d 702 (Utah 1978); State v. Ouzounian, 491 P.2d 1093, 1095,
(Utah 1971); Taylor v. Johnson, 393 P.2d 382, 386, (Utah 1964);
In re Richard's Estate, 297 P.2d 542, 545,
denied 352 U.S. 943 (1956).

(Utah 1956), cert.

See also Skaggs v. Clairol Inc., 85

Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1970).
A.

In Cases Involving Prescription Drugs, Concepts
of Negligence Rather Than Strict Liability
Necessarily Apply In Assessing the Adequacy of
the Warnings.

While Utah has adopted Restatement of Torts (2d),

§

402A,

and Comments g and n, the Utah Supreme Court, has not yet spoken
on Comments h, j, and k.

Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 628

Yi·

P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Ernest
601 P.2d at 158 (Utah 1979).
.
32

Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.,

This is thus a case of first impres-

Sl.On.

Prescription drugs by definition are presumed to possess the
possibility of producing serious, untoward effects.

If this were

not the case, these drugs would not have to be dispensed through
an intermediary, the physician.

The warnings are generally

32
The elements of breach of implied warranty and strict liability
"are essentially the same." Ernest Yi. Hahn, Inc. v. Arno Steel
Co., 601 P.2d at 159.
As noted in Greeno v. Clark Equipment
Company, 237 F.Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965), strict liability
under Section 402A:
is hardly more than what exists under implied
warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines
of privity, disclaimer, requirements of
notice of defect, and limitation through
inconsistencies with express warranties.
(Cont'd)
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addressed to the physician who is also entrusted with the responsibility of making judgments as to the propriety of prescribing a
drug in a given situation.

Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d

1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 548-549.
The development of pharmaceutical preparations frequently
reflects new advances in medical science.

Sometimes drugs are

produced in response to the discovery of a new mechanism for
causing disease, while in other cases, medical science is aware
of the natural mechanism whereby the body accomplishes certain
functions,

but must await a technological advance in order to

synthesize compounds to treat deficiencies.

The process by which

new drugs are discovered or developed, the process necessarily
reflects the continuing evolution in medical/scientific knowledge.
32 (Cont'd)
As such, defendant's comments concerning the inadequacy of the
strict liability instruction as pertains to strict liability
apply with equal force to the instructions pertaining to breach
of warranty.
In this case, there was no allegation that Delalutin, · either
in terms of formula or contents, was other than what Squibb
intended it to be.
In other words, there was no allegation that
the drug was improperly "manufactured. 11 Thus, the only issue
under breach of warranty, or more properly implied warranty since
there were no express warranties, pertained to the adequacy of
the warning. There is, therefore, no practical difference between
the theories of breach of warranty and strict liability.
The
duty to warn in both cases is measured by the same standard.
Smith v. E.R. Squibb~~' Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 480; Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 551.
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Knowledge concerning the hazards associated with any new
drug is also evolutionary in nature.

Sometimes an adverse reaction

appears so infrequently that it cannot be detected even though
the drug is tested on a substantial number of individuals.
~-,

See,

Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry,

Subcomm.
Comm.

on Reorganization and Internal Organization,

on Government Operations,

at 4339 (1969).

88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 11,

Other drug hazards have a latency period which

can mask potential dangers.
stilbestrol,

Senate

Hearings .2Q the Regulation of Diethyl-

Subcomm. of House Comm. on Governmental Operations,

92 Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2 at 233 (1971).
While animal studies are employed to overcome this lack of
knowledge since animals have shorter reproductive cycles and life
spans,

the scientific community readily acknowledges that there

are many gaps in the correlation between experience with test
animals and humans.

Consequently, until there is extensive and

protracted human experience potential hazards may not be detectable.
Finally,

controlled clinical

investigations

cannot begin to

simulate all of the circumstances under which a drug might be
given.
trials

As testified to by physicians,

"pre-marketing clinical

can never subplant wide-spread clinical use as a means

of assessing the ultimate hazards of a drug."
tion For Prescription Drug Injuries," 59 Vir.

Merrill, "Compensa~·

Rev. 1, 20 (1973).

Section 402A evinces an awareness of the potentially stifling
effect that the application of strict liability, divorced from
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the reality of the continuing evolution of medical/scientific
knowledge, could have on the development of new drugs. Comments h,
and k specifically reflect the concern over imposing strict or
33
absolute liability on the manufacturers of prescription drugs.

j

Consequently,

al though knowledge

of dangerous

conditions

is

generally imputed to manufacturers where the doctrine of strict
liability applies,

Comments h,

j

and k dictate that,

in the

context of prescription drugs, the duty to warn is to be measured
33

There is a definite interaction between Comments h, j, and
k.
Ortho Pharmaceutical £2.EE.· v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 546.
Comment h in pertinent part provides:
Where, however, he [the seller] has reason to
anticipate that danger may result from a
particular use, as where a drug is sold which
is safe only in limited doses [or only if not
used at certain times during pregnancy], he
may be required to give adequate warning of
the danger (see Comment j), and a product
sold without such a warning is in a defective
condition.
Comment j states that a product may be unreasonably dangerous if
the manufacturer fails to warn of an inherent danger.
It provides
in pertinent part:
[T]he seller is required to warn [of a danger],
if he has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge of the presence of ... the
danger.
Comment k, dealing with unavoidably unsafe products, speaks of
the manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers in terms of "the
present state of human knowledge," and is consistent with scope
of the duty as defined in comment j.
Although we believe that
this case is more properly analyzed under Comment j, since Squibb
believes that Delalutin is safe, a discussion of which of the
comments apply in what factual situation is not germane to this
argument given the posture of this case on appeal.
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by the traditional negligence concept--reasonable care under the
.
34
circumstances.
See, ~., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 420
A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Law Div. 1980), disapproved on other grounds,
Namm v. Charles E.

Frost~

co., 427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. App. Div.

1981) .
The rationale for applying a negligence standard in prescription drug cases in assessing the scope of the manufacturer's duty
is, perhaps, best expressed in Woodill v. Parke Davis~ Co., 402
N.E. 2d 194 (Ill. 1980), where the court stated:
We believe our holding in this case is
justified because a logical limit must be
placed on the scope of a manufacturer's
liability under a strict liability theory.
To hold a manufacturer liable for failure to
warn of a danger which it would be impossible
to know based on the present state of human
knowledge would make the manuacturer a virtual
insurer of the product .... [Id at 199]_

***
We simply think
in accordance with
comments-· j and k of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where
liability is framed by the manufacturer's
duty to warn adequately of dangers which may
arise from the use of a drug, that liability
should be based £!! there being some manner in
which to know of the danger. Otherwise, the
warning itself, which is the focus of the
liability, would be a meaningless exercise.
[Id. at 200]
34
As noted in Chambers v G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.Supp. 377,
381 (D .. Md. 1975), aff'd o.b:: 567 F.2d 269(4th Cir. 1977) cases
dealing with other products such as machines, where "there may be
a distinction drawn between a negligent failure to warn and the
warning requirements for strict liability 11 , are not apposite in
prescription drug cases.
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Virtually every court which has considered Section 402(A),
Conunents h,

and k, in the context of cases such as this has

j

held that the duty to warn, regardless of plaintiff's theory of
liability, is predicated on traditional concepts of negligence.
The drug company's duty to warn relates only to those dangers
about which it knew, or should have known, through the exercise
of reasonable care.
Smith v. E.R.

As stated by the Michigan Supreme Court in

Squibb~

Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 479-480:

(W]hen liability turns on the adequacy
of a warning, the issue is one of reasonable
care, regardless of whether the theory pled
is negligence, implied warranty or strict
liability in tort.

£2..,

See Chambers v. G. D.

Searle~

v.

628 F.2d at 858; Basko v. Sterling Drugs

Upjohn Co.,

Inc.,

441 F.Supp. at 380-81; Werner

Inc., 416 F.2d at 426; Ortho Pharmaceutical

f.2.!:E.. v. Chapman, 388

N.E.2d at 548; Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d at 197-198;
Dalke v. Upjohn, 555 F.2d 245, 248 {9th Cir. 1977).
Kidwell, "The Duty to Warn:

See generally

A Description of the Model of Decision,"

53 Tex. L. Rev. 1375, 1377-78 (1975).

35

35

Our research has revealed only one prescription drug case
where the court indicated a willingness to impute knowledge of
possible adverse reactions to the manufacturer.
Hamil ton v.
Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1976).
In that case, the evidence
demonstrated that the manufacturer had received numerous reports
of a particular adverse reaction over a period of several years
prior to when the plaintiff sustained her injury. Although the
court did not, therefore, have to address the issue of the scope
of the manufacturer's duty to warn, it did hold that negligence
and strict liability were not identical, even in a drug case.
In
so doing, the court ignored the provisions of comments h, j and k
indicating that knowledge of the drug manufacturer is to be
measured in terms of what the manufacturer knew or should have
known at the time the injury was sustained. No other court has
followed the decision in Hamilton.
-56-
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In this case, Squibb, relying on Needham v. White Laboratories,
Inc.,

639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied

U.S.

I

102

S.Ct. 427 (1981),

sought to defend under Comment j.

applies Comment j

or Comment k, however, makes no difference.

Woodill v. Parke

Davis~

Co.,

Whether one

at 200; Needham, 639 F.2d at 402.

The standard to be applied in determining the adequacy of the
warning is a negligence standard.

Indeed, many courts have found

that the standard is identical to that articulated in the Restate36
ment of Torts (2d) § 388.
See ~, Torsiello v. Whitehall
Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. App. Div. 1979; Sterling Drugs,
Inc.

v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Hoffman v.

'Sterling Drug,

Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140 n.26 (3d Cir. 1973). 37

The trial court apparently recognized the principles urged
by Squibb (Tr.1195, 2593-2595), and supported by prevailing case
36
For a case exclusively applying Section 388 (which embodies
traditional negligence concepts in determining a drug company's
duty to warn), see McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,
528 P.2d 522 (Ore. 1974). In that decision, the court noted that
nothing therein was inconsistent with its decision in Cochran v.
Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Ore. 1966). In so doing, the court confirmed
that Cochran, a case in which the court refused to impose strict
or absolute liability upon a prescription drug manufacturer, was
still good law. McEwen at 530, n. 12. Since McEwen was decided
after Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company, 525 P.2d 1033 (Ore.
1974), a decision quoted from by plaintiff (Tr.1474), it is
apparent that Oregon, like other jurisdictions, distinguishes
between drug and non-drug cases, and applies in the former a
negligence standard in determining the duty to warn under Section
402A.
37
One court has even noted that if, in fact, there is any
difference between strict liability and negligence as pertains to
the adequacy of warnings, the concept of strict liability may
under certain circumstances impose a more stringent burden.
Ortho Pharmaceutical ££!1?.. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 551-552.
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law, that where failure to warn is the issue, the manufacturer's
duty under breach of warranty, strict liability and negligence is
measured by the same standard--what the drug company knew or
should have

known

exercising reasonable care

Court's Instruction Nos. 24 and 27).

( R .1286,

1289;

Having done so, the court

then failed to properly instruct the jury on how the theories of
breach of warranty and strict liability were to be applied where
failure to warn was alleged.
Comments h,

j

We urge that this Court now adopt

and k as the law in Utah and hold that a prescrip-

tion drug manufacturer's duty to warn is circumscribed by what
the manufacturer knew or should have known using reasonable care
for the reasons set out below.

We also urge that this court

order a new trial since the jury Instructions did not properly
limit the applicability of plaintiff's theories of liability
based on the issues in the case.
B.

The Jury Instructions on Breach of Warranty
and Strict Liability Were Erroneous and
Permitted the Jury to Return a Verdict
Premised on Absolute Liability. [38]

The trial court discussed the basic elements involved in
each of the theories upon which the case was being submitted to
38

Strict liability under Section 402A, when divorced from the
defenses enumerated in Comments g, n, and p, is the equivalent of
absolute liability.
Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand, 628 P. 2d at
1302-1303.
It is clear that these comments have no bearing in a
case such as this. Consequently, unless Comments h, j, and k are
adopted, strict liability will become, in fact, absolute liability
in most drug-related cases.

-58-
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the
Nos.

jury in

Instruction No. 18 39

(R.1279-1280).

Instruction

19-24 further defined the elements of negligence (R.1281-

1286).

Instructions Nos. 25-27

(R.1287-1289)

apparently were

intended to define the elements under strict liability, since
Instruction No. 25 is a classic charge in that regard.

Whether

or not Instructions 25-27 were also meant to apply to the basic
charge on breach of warranty is unclear.
question,

however,_

The answer to this

is of no consequence since an affirmative

response would not remedy the deficiency in the instructions.
Instruction No. 25 advised the jury that anyone who manufactured or sold a "product in a defective condition unreasonably
39
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
In order for plaintiff to recover against
defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., on the
theory of breach of warranty (Second Count)
she has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence each and all of the
following facts:
1.
That said defendants represented or
warranted to the plaintiff that said drug was
reasonably fit for safe use by human beings.
2.
That plaintiff's mother relied upon
the said representation or warranty.
3.
That said drug ~ not reasonably
fit for safe use by human beings and was
defective and dangerous.
4.
That £y reason of the defect i? the
drug as aforesaid, the plaintiff sustained
the damages and injuries of which she here
complains.
5.
The amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of said breach of
warranty. [R.1279; emphasis added]
(Cont'd)
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dangerous 11 was liable for any harm caused thereby even though
11

[t]he

...

manufacturer has exercised all possible care .... "
Squibb took exception to Instruction No. 25 "on the

(R.1287).

grounds that it is abstract in form and not applicable to the
facts of the case ...

11

(Tr.2580).

While Instruction No. 18, as it pertained to strict liability
40
and breach of warranty, and Instruction No. 26, (R. 1288),
were
similar to the instructions proposed by the defendant (R.870-871,
881; Squibb's Proposed Instructions 3 and 10), the court refused
39 (Cont'd)

In order for the plaintiff to recovery
against the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., on her theory of strict liability
(Third Count), she has the burden of proving
each and all of the following facts by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1.
That the drug Delalutin was manufactured or marketed by defendant E. R-:Squibb & Sons in ~ defective and unreasonably
dangerous condi ti on for use in pregnant
women.
2.
That no substantial change was made
in the drug from the time it left the hands
of the defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. to
the time it was administered to the plaintiff's
mother.
3.
That as a result of such dangerous
and defect~condition, plaintrff sustained
the damages and injuries of which she her
complains.
[R.1280; emphasis added]

40
Instruction No. 26 in essence advised the jury that a product
was defective and unreasonably dangerous if it "had a propensity
for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary user .... "

-60-
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to give Instruction lOA in the form proposed by Squibb. 41
took exception to

this

(Tr. 2581).

Squibb

The defendant's proposed

instruction read as follows:
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. lOA
You can find the Delalutin in question
to have been in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous only if you determine that
Squibb failed to warn of a known danger in
the use of Delalutin, or a danger which
should have been known given the state of
technological development at the time the
drug was administered to Kathleen Barson in
1972.
[R·~~; emphasis added.]
The purpose of Instruction lOA was to put the concept of
defect,

which related both to breach of warranty and strict

liability,

in the context of the adequacy or inadequacy of the

warning, which was the only basis upon which liability should be
imposed.

The failure of the Instructions to define the terms

"defective and dangerous," "defect," and "defective and unreasonable ·condition" solely in terms of the adequacy of the warning
rendered the charge on breach of warranty and strict liability
fatally defective.
Once the court failed to limit the breach of warranty instruction to the adequacy of the warning based upon what Squibb knew
or should have known,

the jury was free to find that Delalutin

41
The record does not reflect the reasons why the court refused
to instruct the jury that the defective condition pertained only
to the adequacy of the warnings. Most of the conference between
the court and counsel concerning the Instructions was held off
the record (Tr.2132-2139).
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"was not reasonably fit and safe for use in human beings" since
it produced teratogenic effects which rendered i t "defective and
dangerous [Instruction No. 18]."

As instructed,

the jury could

have found Squibb liable under breach of warranty without ever
determining if Squibb breached its duty to warn, based on its
actual or constructive knowledge at the time.
What was said about the Instruction on breach of warranty is
equally true for the charge on strict liability.

Certainly the

Instructions on strict liability, as framed, had the potential to
create in the minds of the jurors the notion that Squibb could be
held absolu_tely responsible.

If the jury found that, despite

exercising "all possible care", Delalutin might be teratogenic
and was,

therefore,

"in a defective and unreasonably dangerous

condition for use in pregnant women [Instruction No. 18]", then
it could find Squibb liable in conformity with Instructions Nos. 18,
25, 26 and 27 without ever considering the adequacy of the warnings
in the light of Squibb's actual knowledge or, indeed, its ability
to know about a drug's potential danger.
Any doubt that the court's Instructions conveyed the idea
that Squibb could be held absolutely liable was resolved by the
comments of plaintiff's counsel.

Specifically, he advised the

jury that "in this case we rely upon three theories" (Tr.2471)
but "we" are "not required to prove each and every one of those
theories of negligence, warranty,
[sic]"

(Tr.2472).

and strict liability; anyone

After suggesting that the theories were in
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fact different, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated his belief that
the

Instructions on breach of warranty and/or strict liability

were tantamount to imposing absolute liability when he later commented to the jury that:
"The court has told you in the instructions that you can find Squibb absolutely
liable under certain circumstances .... "
[Tr.2570].
Of course, counsel's suggestions were erroneous as a matter of
law.
This case is analogous to the case of Skaggs v. Clairol
Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).

In that case, the

trial court charged the jury on the theories of negligence,
strict liability and breach of warranty.

The California appellate

court first noted that:
The [trial] court gave no other instructions on strict liability and never explained
to the jury that the only "defect" in defendants product which found any support in the
evidence was defendants alleged failure to
adequately label its product in such a way as
to warn users that it [could produce certain
adverse reactions].
[ Id. at 588; emphasis
added]
~
Having previously concluded that Comment j merely articulated
well-settled principals of negligence, the appellate court then
went on to find that:
Since the [trial] court had fully instructed on negligence, with particular
reference to negligent labeling, the instructions on "strict" liability were wholly
unnecessary.
They were also dangerously
misleading, in that the court incorrectly
advised the jury that strict liability
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afforded a separate basis for liability,
independent of the negligent labeling theory
on which it had already instructed, and also
incorrectly advised the jury that defendant
could be held strictly liable for a defect in
its product without proof that it was negligent.
[Id. at 588]
Based on this,

the appellate court concluded that:

Faced with the above instructions, the
jury could believe that plaintiff's right to
recover damages from defendant was dependent
solely upon a showing that she purchased
defendants product, used it and suffered an
allergic reaction .... [Id. at 588]
Finding that the defendant's liability was not "so clearly established as to render it improbable that the jury would have returned a different verdict had it been properly instructed", the
California appellate court reversed.

42

Other courts have also recognized that in cases where "defect"
is defined in terms of adequacy of the warning, charging the jury
on strict liability, negligence,

and breach of warranty has the

potential to confuse and mislead the jury.
~Sons,

Smith v. E.R. Squibb

Inc., 273 N.W.2d at 480; Ortho Pharmaceutical

Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 552.

f.2.!:E·

v.

See Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building

Co., Inc., 373 N.Y.S. 2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
In this case, the trial court not only instructed the jury
on three different theories, which in and of itself might have
suggested that the theories differed, but also failed to advise
42

The fact that Squibb's liability was not so clearly established is attested to by the trial judge's statemtent that:
"After one month of trial this court does not know whether Delalutin is teratogenic during the first trimester of pregnancy."
(R.1440).
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the jury that

11

defect 11 or "defective condition" only dealt with

the adequacy of the warning.
tions,

It cannot be denied that the Instruc-

regardless of which theory the jury might have returned

its verdict, had a significant potential to confuse and mislead.

43

Because one "cannot conclude with any degree of assurance" that
if properly instructed the result might not have been more favorable to the appellant, Squibb is entitled to a new trial.

Watters

v. Querry, 588 P.2d 704 (Utah 1978).

43

As noted previously, counsel for the plaintiff advised the
jury that, pursuant to the instructions, the jury could ttfind
Squibb absolutely liable under certain circumstances .... "
(Tr.2570.) Not only is this statement erroneous and misleading
standing alone, but when considered in conjunction with counsel's
statements a few moments earlier that Squibb had a "positive
obligation ... to come in here with positive proof ... to support
their drug," the prejudicial potential of the jury Instructions
is overwhelming (Tr.2570).
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE RELATED TO THE
ALLEGED FAILURE TO TEST SINCE THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT IT.
The defendant requested a directed verdict on the first
count of the complaint (negligence) as it related to negligent
testing.

Squibb argued that no evidence was produced to show

that had animal teratology testing been done it probably would
have provided information concerning the defects complained of by
the plaintiff (Tr.2440, 2442, 2596).
by the court without explanation.

The application was denied

Squibb took exception to the

jury instructions on negligence for the same reason (Tr.2578-2579).
The trial court's rationale for denying the motion was not clarified when Squibb again raised the issue on its motion for judgment
nothwithstanding the verdict or a new trial (Tr.2595-2596, 2631).
For the reasons set forth below, the failure to grant defendant's
motion in this regard not only constituted reversible error, but
further aggravated the errors discussed in Point II.
The jury was instructed that Squibb could be found liable if
it "was negligent in the manufacturing, or testing, or marketing
of the drug Delalutin. 11 (Instruction No. 18; R.1279. ) 44 The
alleged negligence necessarily related to the failure to warn,
although this is not entirely clear from a reading of the Instructions.

In that regard, negligence could only have been predicated

44
Since there was no allegation that the drug was impure, or
otherwise adulterated, negligent manufacture was not an issue.
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either on a failure to warn about known dangers, or the failure
to warn of dangers about which Squibb would, and therefore should,
have known had it "used state of the art" testing techniques. If
the tests which Squibb negligently failed to perform would not
have revealed that Delalutin caused limb anomalies,

then the

failure to test could not have been the proximate cause of Elizabeth
Barson's injuries.

In this case, testimony sufficient to estab-

lish this necessary link in the proximate cause chain is missing.
"There is authority that inherent in the duty to test is the
requirement that the defect would be revealed by testing."
Frumer

~Friedman,

Products Liability§ 6.01(1].

1

This principle

was accepted by the Utah Supreme Court in Northern v. General
Motors

£2!:E.., 268 P.2d 981 (Utah 1954).

126 P.2d 345,

347

(Cal.

1942).

Motors Corp.,

49 N.W.2d 365

45

(Mich.

See Sheward v. Virtue,

In Livesley v. Continental
1951),

cited by the Utah

Supreme Court in the Northern case, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that, where the expert testimony indicated the defect was
"difficult 11 to pick up, there was still a "doubt" that the defect
would have been discovered even if the standard test had been
45
In making this argument, which necessarily presumes existence
of a defect, Squibb is in no way conceding that fact.
As is
apparent from a reading of the trial transcript, none of the
studies relied upon by plaintiff's experts involved Delalutin and
no one has ever claimed in the published literature that biological
cause-and-effect between progestational agents in general, and
Delalutin in particular, and limb anomalies has been proven.
These claims are only made by courtroom experts who rely on older
studies which have not been confirmed by any of the newer studies.
Squibb continues to maintain that Delalutin is not defective.
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Since the evidence did not demonstrate that "the

performed.

test ... would have disclosed on reasonably exercised diligence
the presence of the [defect]," the judgment predicated on negligent
46
testing was reversed. 49 N.W.2d at 369; emphasis added.
Requiring proof that the omitted testing would probably have
demonstrated the defect is only logical.

To hold a manufacturer

liable for not performing all possible tests, while failing to
show that the non-performed test would probably have revealed the
defect,

is to predicate liability on acts without consequence.

Culpable negligence would then be measured in the abstract.
This,

in essence,

is what the trial court sanctioned when it

refused to grant a directed verdict on negligent testing.
The plaintiff offered considerable testimony concerning FDA
guidelines for animal teratology
737, 739). 47

testing(~.,

Tr.560, 620, 638,

The testimony reveals that prior to the 1966

46

See Buria v. Rosedale Engineering £2.!:E.., 184 N.Y.S.2d 395,
397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) New York Appellate Division held that,
despite plaintiff's proofs as to the proper test to determine
whether the machine in question was in good working order,
negligence [was] still not established unless
it be shown that proper testing would have
disclosed the . . . (product] to have been
defective.
There was no proof or offer of
proof to establish that essential fact.
Liability does not attach merely because a
proper inspection could have shown the ...
product to have been defective.
The proof
must be that the inspection would have shown
that to be the case.
[Emphasis in the original]
47

The FDA guidelines for teratology tests on animals were
introduced in evidence (Tr.559, 2015; P.Ex. 62). Despite all the
evidence in this regard, no testimony was offered by the plaintiff
to the effect that there is a probability that such tests would
have revealed to Squibb that Delalutin might cause limb anomalies.
(Cont'd)
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implementation of the FDA guidelines on animal teratology testing,
Squibb had ten years experience with the drug in humans.

That

experience did not in any way suggest that the drug could cause
limb anamolies (Tr. 2043-2044).

Further,

animal testing in the

nature of teratologic evaluation (i.e. administration to a pregnant
dam with study of the pregnant offspring) was performed by Squibb
in the early 1960's with no adverse effects observed (Tr.1931-1938).
In light of that experience, when Squibb inquired of the FDA in
1966 as to whether animal teratology testing should be done with
Delalutin, the FDA indicated that it was not necessary (Tr.559-561,
564, 1677-1680, 1695-1696, 1953):
With Delalutin, I went down to the Food
and Drug when they requested from--the Food
and Drug came out to ask us to review all of
our compounds and Delalutin was one of them
on the list and I went down to see Dr. Lehman,
Arnold Lehman, who was the head of the Pharmacology Division of the FDA, and he informed
us--and I think he had with him at the same
time the endocrinologist that worked with
him, Dr. Custis [sic]--the two of them felt
that the human is the best species for teratological tests and they said since you have
so many cases in the human, you do not need
teratological tests in animals.
[Tr.1677-1678]
47 (Cont'd)
Plaintiff also introduced considerable other testimony in an
attempt to demonstrate that Squibb was negligent in testing
Delalutin.
This included the introduction of in-house documents
which were written prior to the FDA approval of the drug for
marketing (Tr.1502; P.Ex. 229, 230, 231, 232)).
In light of the
fact that the testing under discussion was all performed prior to
FDA approval of the Delalutin NDA, these documents were wholly
irrelevant.
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All three of plaintiff's medical experts adopted the position
of the FDA in minimizing the importance of animal testing as an
accurate barometer of a drug's teratogenic potential where one
already has extensive experience in'humans.

Dr. Done, for example,

observed that:
A drug may be teratogenic in animals but
not necessarily in humans or it may be teratogenic in humans and not in animals.
It may
also be different from one experimental
animal to another ... so one doesn't really
know in the last analysis what the real
answer is in terms of people except £y people's
experience.

Surveillance of what happens in people
who receive a drug is a crucial part for any
effect, but particularly for one like tera-·
togenicity where we don't really even have
animal models that necessarily correlate with
what happens in people.
So observations of
what is happening in people who receive the
drug ... and to their offspring is crucial in
getting what, in the last analysis, will be
the only meaningful answer in whether the
drug causes defects in people or not.
[Tr.697698; emphasis added]
Dr. Done further testified that animal studies had not shown
Delalutin to be masculinizing (Tr.769,771), 48 and that, indeed,
48
Squibb had a continuing objection to testimony on "masculinization" (used interchangeably at trial with "androgenic" and
"virilization") (Tr. 612-613) .
Yet despite the fact that the
issue of masculinization was totally irrelevant, particularly
since Elizabeth Barson sustained no such injury, the issue played
a prominent role in the trial {Tr.294, 612, 613, 624-625, 627,
634, 636, 769, 771, 773, 1218, 1318, 1863, 1929-1930, 1938, 2010,
2038; and see Ex. 72, 73, 74, 415, 417, 520, 535, 779, and 781).
Throughout, Squibb took the position that Delalutin is not masculinizing although other progestational agents might be {Tr.1863,
1929-30, 1938, 2010, 2038).
There was no testimony that drugs
(Cont'd)
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there was a study using rhesus monkeys which showed Delalutin to
be not only safe but effective (Tr.855-856).
Dr. Nora testified that he had foregone a study in animals
because human studies were more important since "you can't always
be sure that what happened in non-humans will happen in humans"
(Tr.1066).

Finally,

the comments of Dr. Goldman, another expert

called by the plaintiff on rebuttal, are instructive:
To me the ideal animal model was one
which duplicates the intended human use
exactly, and from that point of view we don't
have any.
In other words, none of the studies
were done in the exact way that they were
intended for human use.
However--and it is
true that with the exception of the one
observation of [Dr.] Lerner concerning Delalutin there are no other published reports
so--but that doesn't say that there doesn't
exist an animal model, it simply says no one
has published any observations on it at all.
So in other words, if one did the proper
study with Delalutin one may find an animal
model or
may not.
That's unclear.
[Tr.2376; emphasis added]

™

48
which masculinize also, or necessarily, cause limb malformations;
in fact, the testimony was that masculinizing drugs do not cause
malformations (Tr. 1936-1937, 2197).
The plaintiff apparently sought to introduce such evidence
on the theory that since Squibb acknowledged that some progestational agents might be masculinizing it should have been put on
notice to do teratology animal testing (Tr.1494). Since there is
no evidence that animal testing would have revealed anything,
ipso facto, the evidence on masculinization introduced to show
that Squibb should have been put on notice to do testing is
entirely irrelevant.
Such evidence should have been excluded
pursuant to U.R.E. 4.
If not totally irrelevant, the potential
prejudice so outweighed the probitive value, that the evidence
should have been excluded pursuant to U.R.E. 45.
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None of the plaintiff's experts testified that there is a
reasonable probability that were Squibb to have done animal
teratology testing it would have learned anything to suggest that
Delalutin caused limb anomalies.

Based on all the evidence, it

would be mere speculation to assume that Squibb would have learned
anything to suggest that Delalutin caused limb anomalies had it
performed teratological

studies

Indeed,

on animals.

a

fair

reading of all of the testimony suggests just the opposite.

As a

matter of law then, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case based on a theory of negligent testing.

Chambers v. G.D.

Searle

~

~.,

268 P.2d at 291; Livesley v. Continental

Co.,

441 F.Supp.

at 385; Northern v. General Motors
Motors~.,

N.W.2d at 365; Sheward v. Virtue, 126 P.2d at 345.
court,

having denied defendant's

49

The trial

application for a directed

verdict on the theory of negligent testing, and having instructed
the jury on this theory, committed reversible error.
Perry, 140 P.2d 772 (Utah 1943).
382 .

Morrison v.

See Taylor v. Johnson, 393 P.2d

.
. 1 ed to a new trial.
.
49
Squi. bb is,
t h ere f ore, entit

49
As noted at the beginning of Point III, the failure of the
court to grant a directed verdict on the issue of negligent
testing lends support to the argument made in Point II.
Instructing the jurors on an issue for which there was no factual support
could only further mislead and confuse the jury to the prejudice
of the defendant. Thus, even if each of the errors
may not by themselves j us ti fy a reversal,
[they] may well, when considered together
with others, render it clear that a fair
trial was not had.
In such an event justice
can only be served by granting a new trial.
[Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah
1959)].
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE RELATING TO: (1) THE EFFICACY
OF DELALUTIN AND (2) PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 58
CONTAINING REFERENCES TO DRUG EXPERIENCE REPORTS.

Plaintiff's counsel was permitted over objections to introduce
entirely irrelevant evidenqe concerning the efficacy of Delalutin.
Needham v.

White

Laboratories,

639 F. 2d 394.

Additionally,

plaintiff was permitted to improperly summarize Drug Experience
Reports ("DER's") that had been excluded.

See,

~.,

Intermountain

Farmers Ass'n v.

Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978), cert.

denied,

860

439 U.S.

(1979)

The admission of this evidence,

either independently or in conjunction with other erroneously
admitted evidence,

requires that a new trial be granted since

this evidence "probably had a substantial influence in bringing
about the verdict .... "
A.

U.R.E. 4.

The Evidence as to Efficacy was Irrelevant
arid Prejudicial.

Squibb's motion in limine urged the exclusion of evidence
pertaining to the efficacy of Delalutin (R. 591-593; PR.62-64).
The plaintiff argued that the evidence was relevant on two issues:
the inadequacy of testing (PR.64) and punitive damages (PR.70).
Plaintiff also argued that the issue of efficacy was so intertwined
with the issue of safety that it was impossible to put in evidence
on the latter point without discussing the former (PR. 67-68).
The trial court initally deferred any ruling on this question
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(PR.73), indicating that it would wait until the time of trial to
make such rulings (PR.74).
Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, Squibb again
moved to exclude evidence on efficacy (Tr. 263-280).
advanced the
269). SO

same

arguments

The plaintiff

for admissibility (Tr.263,

At the conclusion of the argument,

267,

the court again

declined to rule; the trial judge did, however, caution plaintiff's
counsel that they would run the risk of causing prejudice by
discussing the subject of efficacy in their opening remarks to
50

In response to the plaintiff's pre-trial assertion prior to
trial that the proper testing of Delalutin was an issue, the
following colloquy took place:
THE COURT:

[Tested] [p]roperly for what purpose?

MR. HUNTLEY [Counsel for Plaintiff]:
on pregnant women.

For use

THE COURT: Well, isn't it properly for the
use of safety rather than properly for what
it's suppose to do? [Tr. 269]
After more discussion,

the Court again evidenced its concern as

to why the material on efficacy was relevant:
THE COURT: If what you are saying is correct,
and it will be a controverted issue of fact
as to efficacy. My problem in the whole thing
is what difference does it make? You're [referring to Squibb] saying it makes no difference
because that isn't anything they are to decide
here, whether it suited its purpose or not.
You're [i.e. referring to plaintiff] saying
that it is so interwoven in their motives in
testing that you can't separate it.
MR. RACINE [counsel for plaintiff]:
That's
precisely right.
I don't know how we can.
[Tr.272]
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the jury (Tr.276-280).

Subsequently,

in his opening statement,

plaintiff's counsel made reference to efficacy testing to which
there was an objection.

The objection was overruled (Tr.291).

Over objection, plaintiff was permitted to question Dr. Done
about whether Delalutin had ever been proven efficacious in
maintaining pregnancy (Tr.759-760).
his opinion it had not (Tr.761, 811).

Dr. Done testified that in
51

The subject of efficacy

again came up during Squibb's cross-examination of Dr. Nora when,
in a series of non-responsive answers, he volunteered that neither
he nor the FDA thought that hormones sustained pregnancy,
that the FDA

11

and

came out with reports that said these things don't

have anything to do with maintaining pregnancy [Tr .1053-1054].

11

The trial judge allowed those answers despite Squibb's motion to
strike on the ground that efficacy was not an issue (Tr.1054).
The plaintiff continued to raise on cross-examination of Squibb's
witnesses the subject of studies indicating that Delalutin had
not been proven effective (Tr.1646, 1847, 1854, 1991).

During

the examination of plaintiff's rebuttal witness, Dr. Goldman, the
issue was again raised (Tr.2390).
51
Assuming, that the efficacy of a drug is relevant on the
issue of liability, the test is "apparent" efficacy at the time
of manufacturer and not efficacy in fact.
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly
and Co., 420 A.2d at 1319. Thus, besides the testimony on efficacy
being-irrelevant, the testimony of plaintiff's experts, which
went to the question of efficacy in fact, was certainly inadmissible.
Assuming efficacy to be relevant, the only issue was wh.ether
Squibb could reasonably believe, as found by the NAS-NRC in 1971,
that Delalutin was "probably effective." See this Brief, supra
at 8.
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Plaintiff's argument that efficacy was relevant to the issue
of punitive damages was rendered moot when the court granted a
directed verdict on that issue at the end of plaintiff's case
(Tr.1497).

Since efficacy testing was irrelevant on the issue of

whether animal teratology testing would have revealed any information concerning limb anomalies, such evidence was also irrelevant
on the

.
issue
of

52
.
neg 1 1gence.

c onsequentl y,

th e

.
on1 Y b as1s

remaining in the record for the trial court to admit evidence on
efficacy,

or on testing directed to establishing it, was that

such evidence was inseparable from evidence concerning safety or
.
. .
53
teratogen1c1ty.
A

review of the record indicates that there were only two

classes of documents which mention both efficacy and safety.

One

class is the FDA mandated package inserts which we have previously
discussed; the other class consisted of references to a single
report of a test on rhesus monkeys (Tr.2604).

Consquently,

52

Squibb repeatedly stressed the fact that efficacy studies
and teratology studies were designed to demonstrate entirely
different things and that efficacy studies proved nothing as to
safety (PR.71-72; Tr.266).
53

In fact, this
justification:

remained the plaintiff's only post-trial

Additionally, counsel [for Squibb] is in
error in suggesting that the "lack of efficacy 11
evidence was put in before the jury on the
issue of the drug being defective.--Rather,
it was part of the overall history of the
marketing of the drug showing lack of proper
testing by Squibb, and the evidence on efficacv
merely came in because it ~ interwoven in
the documentary and other evidence concerning
the history of the marketing of the drug.
(R.
at p. 14, emphasis added]
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evidence

on efficacy could easily have been segregated from

evidence relating to safety.
tuitous;

i t was,

however,

The evidence on efficacy was gra-

significant and prejudicial because,

despite protestations of plaintiff's counsel to the contrary, the
jury could easily have gotten the impression that efficacy,
lack thereof,

was relevant on the issue of defect.

defendant is entitled to a new trial.

or

As such,

Needham v. White Laboratories,

639 F.2d 394.
In Needham,

the daughter of a woman who took Dienestrol

brought an action against White Laboratories alleging the drug
caused her cancer.

During the course of the trial, the district

court permitted in evidence testimony pertaining to efficacy.
The defendant,

White Laboratories,

appealed from that ruling.

The Seventh Circuit held that the admission of evidence concerning the effectiveness of the drug Dienestrol for treatment of
threatened and habitual miscarriages constituted reversible error
where the defendant drug company did not defend on the ground
that the drug was "unavoidably unsafe 11 as that term is used in
the the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, Comment k.

The court

noted that
[a] comment k defense is available only where
the manufacturer warned of the danger, yet
the product remains dangerous even if the
warning is followed.
[Needham, 639 F.2d at 402]
During the trial White asserted that it did not know and
reasonably could not have known of the dangerous propensity of
Dienestrol.
"Thus,

For that reason no warning accompanied the drug.

conunent k, by its terms, could not provide a defense .... "
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Id. at 402.

White's defense is analogous to that proffered here,

with Squibb 'continuing to maintain that Delalutin does not cause
limb anomalies.
as a defense.

Thus, as in Needham, Comment k was not available
Rather,

basis of Comment j.
irrelevant.

Squibb properly sought to defend on the
Evidence of efficacy or inefficacy was

In Needham, the Seventh Circuit observed in revers-

ing:
White never attempted to assert an
affirmative defense based on comment k.
Rather, White correctly argued that comment j
governed this cause of action for the dispositi ve issue in this case is whether White
should be held liable for its failure to warn
of the risk of cancer to the offspring of
pregnant women who use Dienestrol.
If White
knew, or by the application of reasonable
human skill and foresight should have known
of the risk of cancer, White is liable to
Needham for its failure to warn. Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37 Ill.
Dec. 304, 402 N:'"E.2d 194 (1980).
Because
White failed to warn, comment k could not
apply in this case and evidence of the efficacy
or inefficacy of Dienestrol was irrelevant.
[Needham v. White Laboratories, 639 F.2d at
402]
The holding of Needham is applicable here.

Squibb never

asserted the Comment k defense for unavoidably unsafe products.
Its position is that Delalutin does not cause birth defects.
Accordingly, Comment j governs and evidence of whether Delalutin
was effective or ineffective in preventing miscarriages is irrelevant.

Since the concept of defect was never defined, and the

jury was never given a limiting instruction as to how, if at all,
efficacy could be considered, one cannot dismiss the possibility
that the jury maintained the misconception that the lack of
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efficacy, per se, constituted a defect.

Certainly, neither the

parties nor the court know how the jury evaluated this evidence.
As such, Squibb is entitled to a new trial.

Needham, 639 F.2d at

402-403, and see Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702. 54

B.

Testimony and a Summary Containing Information
From FDA Drug Evaluation Reports Were Improperly Received In Evidence by the Trial Court.

During the course of the redirect testimony of the plaintiff's
expert Dr. Done, counsel sought for the first time to introduce
in evidence the DER's on Delalutin submitted to the FDA pursuant
to 21

u. s. c.

§

355 ( j)

(Tr. 935).

The Federal Food,

Drug and

Cosmetic Act requires that drug companies routinely forward these
FDA any reports they receive regarding experiences with a particular drug regardless of the source of that information.
§

21 U.S.C.

355(j); 21 C.F.R. §310.300.
The trial court sustained Squibb's objection to the computer

printout summarizing the DER's respecting Delalutin from 1969-1979,
but inexplicably permitted Dr. Done to relate this information to
the jury in testimony and by reference to a summary exhibit
54
Even if marginally relevant, evidence as to efficacy should
have been excluded since the probative value was "substantially
outweighed by the risk that it admission . . . [would] create
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the .issues
or of misleading the jury. 11
U. R. E. 45.
See Terry v. Zions
Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2 at 323-325, Watkins v. Utah
Poultry & Farmers CO::Op, 251 P.2d at 667, SheEard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933), Hoffman v. Sterling Drugs, Inc.,
374 F.Supp. 850, 862-863 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
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(Tr. 935-940).

This

testimony and reference to the DER' s

on

Delalutin (Tr.941-942) was extremely prejudicial to Squibb because
virtually no other mention of Delalutin being associated with .limb anomalies was contained on P.Ex. 58.

Since the court per-

mitted the prejudicial introduction of this compound hearsay,
over appropriate objection,

Squibb is entitled to a retrial.

U.R.E. 4, 63 (15), and 70.
In an effort to introduce this multiple hearsay evidence,
plaintiff's counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Done that the FDA
computer printout summarizing DER's relating to Delalutin was
itself an official government record kept in the ordinary course
of the FDA's business (Tr.939; Proposed P.Ex. 79).
Dr.

Done,

Of course,

who had obtained these reports under the Freedom of

Information Act (Tr.935) provided no information as to how the
FDA's computer printout was prepared, nor is it likely from the
examination of foundational testimony adduced that he had any
idea.

Dr. Done, while opining that this computer printout was,

in fact, made in course of the regular course of the FDA' s business,
provided the trial court with no foundational information upon
which it could make such a finding (Tr.936). Dr. Done, however,
candidly advised the court that this computer printout, apparently
published by the FDA, was one of the sources of information which
was contained on P.Ex.58, a summary chart introduced in evidence
in connection with his

testimony (Tr. 935;

Proposed P. Ex. 79;

P. Ex. 58) .
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The summary exhibit itself had been the subject of strenuous
and repeated objections by the attorneys for Squibb (Tr.714-722).
Buried within that exhibit was the following reference:
FDA Reports 1969-79" (P.Ex. 58).

"Done,

The initial objections to the

admissibility of P.Ex. 58 were made by Squibb because it purported
to

extract and extrapolate

literature.

factual information from medical

In essence, Squibb argued that this was an indirect

way of introducing into evidence "learned treatises" which could
otherwise not be introduced (Tr.724-725).
Jenkins v. Parrish,
55
627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981).
The trial judge, however, overruled
55
In addition to containing reference to the DER's, P.Ex. 58
also contained numerous references to studies involving oral
contraceptives and hormonal pregnancy tests.
Squibb repeatedly
objected to the introduction of testimony concerning other drugs
on the basis of the fact that, while there was some similarity,
there were also substantial differences between Delalutin and
these drugs.
For example, hormonal pregnancy tests and oral
contraceptives also contain estrogen. Dr. Done acknowledged that
the inclusion of such drugs in any study on the effect of progestegins could introduce a confounding or confusing factor
(Tr.823, 875, 890, and 892).
The introduction of testimony,
including Exhibit 58, containing references to other drugs, containing compounds not in Delalutin, had the capacity to confuse
the issues and mislead the jury. While defendant believes that
such evidence was irrelevant, even if marginally relevant, the
probative value was far outweighed by the risk of prejudice to
the defendant.
U.R.E. 45. See Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile
Inst., 605 P.2d at 323-325, Watkins v. Utah Poultry and Farmers
co-op, 251 P.2 at 667, Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. at 104.
Thus, in Hoffman v. sterling Drugs, Inc., 374 F.Supp. at 862-863,
the district court excluded evidence concerning the known side
effects of other drugs which were chemically "quite similar" to
the drug in issue (Aralen). The court characterized the evidence
as being "of dubious value," and rejected it on the ground that
its admission had the capacity, among other things to "mislead
{Cont'd)
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Squibb's objection (Tr.722-723).

At no time during the course of

this argument did the plaintiff identify the source of these so
called "FDA Reports" to the court nor were they presented to the
jury before redirect examination.
It is clear that in U.R.E. 70 does not permit the introduction of summarized information simply because the underlying
information itself is voluminous.
Louis~·

See Gull Laboratories, Inc. v.

Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756 (Utah 1979).

U.R.E. 70(l)(g) is

a best evidence rule permitting summaries in lieu of the original
materials only when they are so voluminous that their handling in
56
.
d e 1 ay an d inconvenience.
.
.
U.R.E. 70,
court wou 1 d resu 1 t in
however, does not excuse a party from laying a proper foundation
for the admission of the underlying documents in evidence.

This

point was forcibly made by this Court in Intermountain Farmers
Ass'n. v.

Fitzgerald,

574 P.2d 1162.

The Utah Supreme Court

found that error was committed when the trial court allowed
defendant to read in material contained in exhibits that had
55 (Cont'd)

the factfinder. 11
Hoffman, 374 F. Supp. at 862-863.
Evidence
concerning other drugs such as oral contraceptives and hormonal
pregnancy tests, which contain estrogen and were therefore different than Delalutin, should not have been ad.mi tted.
Their
inclusion in Exhibit 58 confirms the error and highlights the
prejudice to the defendant in admitting that exhibit.
56
U.R.E. 70(l)(g) provides
be present in court for use
either the adverse party must
must find their production is

that the voluminous writings must
in cross-examination.
Otherwise
waive their production or the court
unnecessary.
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been previously denied admission.

Id.,

574 P.2d at 1164.

This

Court went on to observe that:
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
prohibits proof of contents of a writing,
other than by the writing itself, with few
exceptions.
None of said exceptions were
noted here.
The record reveals that general revenue
records, magazine articles, and other such
evidence were not allowed in, but were used
as the basis of testimony ....
. . . . The conduct of the defendant,
reading the exhibits that had been excluded
or refused, circumvented the very rule of law
provided in Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
For though the exhibits were
refused, the unsubstantiated information
contained in those exhibits were nevertheless
presented directly to the jury for its full
consideration by the defendant's verbatim
reading of the exhibits.
[ Intermountain
Farmers Ass'n. v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d
1166-1166]
See International Harvester Credit £2.!:E.. v. Pioneer Tractor and
Implement,
~

Co.,

Inc.,

626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981); Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft

622 P.2d 1168

(Utah 1980); Gull Laboratories,

Inc. v.

Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756.
The underlying documentation, the DER's, which were summarized
by Dr. Done, were found to be inadmissible by the trial court
(Tr. 940).

The trial judge was clearly correct in sustaining

Squibb's objection since no foundation was laid to establish that
the DER's were made and kept in the ordinary course of the FDA's
business, nor was any foundation developed to show that they were
"official records. 1157
57
U.R.E. 63(13) permits the receipt of business records.
While this Court has found that records kept by government agencies
themselves can by admitted under the business records' exception,
(Cont'd)
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The decisions by the Utah Supreme Court requiring that
summarized records themselves be admissible in evidence is a
reflection of this Court's concern that reliable and trustworthy
information is placed before the factfinder.

See,

~.

Interna-

tional Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement,
Inc.,

626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).

They are also consistent with

the rulings of virtually every other Federal and state court
which has considered the admission of such compilations.

As we

have noted, DER's are sporadic, voluntary and at best anecdotal
reports of inj-q.ries and their association with a drug.

When

received for their truth they are testimonial in character and
therefore hearsay.

Squibb,

since it does not initiate these

reports, cannot be said to have made and kept them in the ordinary
course of its business, nor, of course, can the FDA.
See United States v.
Forward Comm. f.2.EE.·

Lieberman,
v.

1979); United States v.
cert.

denied sub !!2!!!·

(1979).

But~

637 F.2d 95

United States,
Plum,

U.R.E. 63(13).

(2d Cir. 1980);

608 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl.

558 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1977),

Younge v. United States, 441 U.S. 910

Mississippi River Grain Elev., Inc. v. Bartlett

& co., Grain, 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). 58
57 (Cont'd)
Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978), Dr. Done, of course, was
not competent to testify with respect to the method and circumstances of their preparation so as to satisfy the necessary
foundational requirements.
Of course, as we have already noted,
the DER's were not qualified as an official report under U.R.E.
63(15) because none of the stated conditions, were, in fact,
observed.
58

Nor could these documents be properly recieved on the issue
of notice to the drug company or the like.
First, the DER's
themselves received in evidence are lumped for a ten year period.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library{Cont
Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-84administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

ri)

Several Federal cases evaluating the reliability of information received by government agencies similar to the FDA pursuant
to

similar statutory schemes

demonstrate that the materials

should be rejected as evidence because of their hearsay and
untrustworthy nature.

In McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270,

278 (1st Cir. 1981) the First Circuit upheld the exclusion in a
products liability case of several Consumer Product Safety Commission reports and a portion of a deposition of a defendant's
expert witness relying on the information contained in them.

In

that case the plaintiff had urged that these reports be admitted
to show knowledge of similar accidents,

the existence of the

product's defect, the fact that it caused the plaintiff's injury,
and the fact that it was negligently designed.

The Federal

appellate court observed that:
The exclusion of the reports were appropriate. They constituted inadmissible hearsay
on the issues of defect, causation, and
negligent design.
Even if the CPSC report
arguably could fit within
[the]
exception for public agency reports, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the reports in the instant case ....
The CPSC reports are untrustworthy because
they contain double hea~say in many instances-the CPSC investigator at one level, and the
accident victim interviewee at yet another
level removed. Most of the data contained in
the reports is simply a paraphrasing of
versions of accidents given by the victims
58 (Cont'd)
Thus, it is unclear how many if any such reports were received
prior to the drug being prescribed for Mrs. Barson in July of
1972. Moreover, since it is generally agreed that birth defects
occur spontaneously in at least 2% of live births, one would
expect to find thousands of children born with birth defects
whose mothers coincidentally were given Delalutin. See McKinnon
v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981).
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themselves who surely cannot be regarded as
disinterested observers.
[McKinnon v. Skil
Corp., 638 F.2d at 278; emphasis added]
See also John Mcshane, Inc. v. Cesna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632,
635-636 (3d Cir. 1977) {Third Circuit upheld the exclusion of
analogous National Transportation Safety Board accident report
which included statements by pilots,

accident witnesses and

reports of government investigators).
The unreliable hearsay which was impermissibly sununarized by
the defendant's expert was particularly prejudicial to Squibb
because it amounted to virtually the only evidence directly
implicating Delalutin in causing limb anomalies.

This unreliable

information was not brought out during the initial examination of
Dr. Done but was elicited during redirect and after counsel for
the defendant had clearly and repeatedly advised the trial court
of the error in permitting such testimony.

For these reasons,

the trial court's error in permitting Dr. Done to testify as to
the content of these highly prejudicial DER's, requires a reversal
by this Court. 59
59
Receipt of this evidence cannot be justified as data reasonably relied upon by experts either. Although this Court in State
v. Clayton, No. 82-17518 (Utah May 6, 1982) (slip opinion), which
expanded U.R.E. 56(2) to permit experts to testify based upon
facts and data not in evidence but which are reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field, does not permit the receipt of such
hearsay information in evidence.
Cf. Merit Motors, Inc., v.
Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (0:-C. Cir. 1977); Bryailv. John
Bean Division of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1978--r:-More important, Dr. Done never laid an adequate foundation that
such information was reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular
See Fed. R. Evid. 703; Zenith Radio ~
Coro. v.
. field.
Matsushita
Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd., 505 F.Supp. 1313, 1324-1330
(E.D. Pa. 1980). -

--

-86-
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POINT V
SQUIBB IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

Subsequent to the judge's verdict the Fertility and Maternal
Health Drug Advisory Committee of the FDA conducted proceedings
to determine whether modification should be made to the physician
and patient package inserts which were admitted in evidence
during this

trial.

Based upon those hearings the Committee

recommended to the FDA that i t modify the mandated package insert
for Delalutin finding that "the amended label should indicate
that progesterone and ... [Delalutin] ... do not appear to have
any significant teratogenic potential and the current labeling
suggesting teratogenic potential of sex hormones

[should] ...

be modified" (FDA Fertility Committee Minutes at 17; Tr.2610-2612,
2625).

The FDA currently has this recommendation under advisement

(Tr. 2614) .
This evidence was not available during the course of trial
and could not through the exercise of due diligence been discovered
and produced.

As we have previously noted,

the plaintiff made

repeated use of the FDA mandated warnings to suggest in both
examination and closing arguments to the jury that the FDA, this
nation's

public heal th expert,

believed that Delalutin could

cause birth defects including limb defects (Tr.2561-2563).

In

view of the dominant evidential role given these warnings, evidence
that the responsible FDA Advisory Committee studying these drugs

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-87Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had recommended modification of the FDA mandated inserts to
.
.
.
. f'ican t . 60
exclude Delalutin
is
signi

The evidence was of such

significance that had it been available at trial there is a
reasonable likelihood that a different result would have occurred.
In Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), this court
held that under U.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) and 60 a party requesting a new
trial must demonstrate that material and competent evidence was
in fact newly discovered and that due diligence would not have
uncovered it prior to trial.

In view of the fact that this

recommendation was made over a month after trial no amount of due
.
th e origina
. . 1 t ria
. 1 . 61
·
cou ld h ave pro d uce d •;t d uring
d i · 1 igence
Cf.

In re Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstray,

{Utah 1981).

628 P.2d 1286

Utah also requires that the evidence not be cumula-

tive or incidental but rather be of such

subs~ance

that a reason-

able likelihood exists that were it available to the jury they
would have reached a different

result~

See Gregerson v. Jensen,

617 P.2d at 372.

Squibb presented such evidence to the trial judge and the
court's failure to grant a new trial was an abuse of discretion
warranting reversal.
60
The basis of the
they were reviewed by
their recommendation.
which is the critical
Committee of the FDA
earlier FDA action.

newly discovered evidence is not the data
the Committee which formed the basis of
Instead it was the recommendation itself
development where an official Advisory
enters a finding in contradiction to an

61

The qualitative nature of this evidence is not the issue.
It is clearly apparent that the jury received inaccurate and
incomplete evidence because the FDA mandated package inserts
alone are before it.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully urges
that this Court vacate the Judgment and remand the matter for a
new trial on all issues.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

By:

~RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant,
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
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